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Chapter I
Introduction
This document is a tutorial for the HARP software program, which is a member of the
Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor (HARP) integrated Reliability (HiRel) tool system for
reliability/availability prediction (refs. 1 and 2). (See vol. 1 of this TP.)
HiRel offers a toolbox of integrated I reliability/availability programs that can be used to
customize the user's application in a workstation or nonworkstation environment. HiRel consists
of interactive graphical input/output programs and four reliability/availability modeling engines
that provide analytical and simulative solutions to a wide host of highly reliable fault-tolerant
system architectures and is also applicable to electronic systems in general. Three of the HiRel
programs were developed by researchers at Duke University and at NASA Langley Research
Center.
The tool system was designed to be compatible with most computing platforms and operating
systems, and some programs have been beta tested within the aerospace community for over
8 years. Many examples of the system's use have been reported in the literature and at tile
HARP Workshop conducted at Duke University, July 10 11, 1990.
The wide range of applications of interest has caused HiRel to evolve into a family of
independent programs that communicate with each other through files that each program
generates. In this sense, HiRel offers a toolbox of integrated programs that can be executed
to customize the user's application. Figure 1 shows the HiRel tool system. The core of this
capability consists of the reliability/availability modeling engines, which are collectively called
the Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor (HARP).
The modeling engines are comprised of four self-contained executable software components:
the original HARP program (described in vols. 1 and 2 of this TP), the Monte Carlo integrated
HARP (MCI-HARP) (ref. 3), Phased Mission HARP (PM-HARP) (ref. 4), and X Window
System HARP (XHARP) (ref. 5). In conjunction with the engine suite, are two input/output
interactive graphical user-interface programs that provide a workstation environment for Hil:lel.
These programs are called the Graphics Oriented (GO) program (described in vol. 3) and the
HARP Output (HARPO) program (described in vol. 4). The base components of HiRel (GO,
HARP, MCI-HARP, and HARPO) are available through NASA's software distribution facility,
COSMIC, 2 or from the developers at Duke University. 3 The XHARP engine 4 is available from
the university where it was developed. PM-HARP can be obtained from The Boeing Commercial
Airplane Group. ,_
A number of examples are presented in this tutorial beginning with simple models and
progressing to more complex ones to illustrate the HARP capability and to present more detail on
the HARP modeling process. This tutorial only demonstrates the textual input/output HARP
format. The developers were successful in retaining an identical textual input/output and file
1 Integrated denotes the ability of HiRel software programs to communicate with each other in a common ASCII file
format. These files are discussed in volume 1 of this Technical Paper.
2 COSMIC, The University of Georgia, 382 East Broad St., Athens, GA 30602.
a Duke University, Dept. of Electrical Eng., Durham, NC, 27706 (Kishor S. Trivedi).
4 Clemson University, Dept. of Computer Science, Clemson, SC 29734 (Robert Geist).
5 The Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Seattle, WA 98124 (Tilak C. Sharma).
Figure 1. HiRel: GO, HARPO, and suite of reliability engines.
structure for all versions of HARP running on different computing platforms. This convenience
was accomplished by implementing textual HARP in ANSI standard Fortran 77.
Graphical input/output capabilities are presented in volumes 3 and 4 of this Technical Paper.
The graphical user interfaces (GUI), GO and HARPO, use the ANSI standard Graphical Kernel
System (GKS) software to facilitate portability across several graphical display devices. Unlike
the success achieved with textual HARP, the GUI's do not have identical appearances on the
screens of different display devices associated with their different computing platforms. The
difference in appearance is fortunately minimal and was dictated as such by the GKS installed
on a particular comt uting platform (ref. 2).
Although some modeling concepts are explained in this document to illustrate the modeling
process, the bulk of the theoretical concepts are presented in volume 1 of this Technical Paper and
in several research papers cited in the reference section. The most comprehensive compilation
of HiRel papers can be found in the proceedings of the HARP Workshop.
Combinatorial fault occurrence/repair models (FORM's) are initially presented in this
volume. The single fault/error handling models (FEHM's) are presented next and are followed
by the HARP multifault/error handling models applied to the near-coincident fault application.
Appendix A provides file listings of worked examples from this tutorial, and appendix B
provides additional examples with particular emphasis on the dynamic fault tree gates. Sequence
dependency FORM's are also presented in appendix B.
Important concepts necessary to use HARP properly are presented in volume 1 of this
Technical Paper, which should be read before any serious applications are undertaken with this
capability. HiRel includes a number of software programs that are described in other volumes of
this Technical Paper that may facilitate the user's productivity in using the HARP capability.
Volumes 3 and 4 present the GO and the HARPO software programs, respectively. These
documents describe the GUI for HiRel.
In the body of this document, a dialog is presented to illustrate tile interaction between the
user and the program. HARP commands are prefaced with the symbol $ or more commonly
with no special prefix, and user responses within the sample sessions are identified with the
symbol > preceding the response.
The GO, HARP, and HARPO Hittel software t)rograms have been ported to many computing
platforms and operating systems, which include Sun Microsystems, DEC VAX, IBM-compatibles
286, 386, and 486 PC's, Apollo, Alliant, Convex, Encore, Gould, Pyramid, and Berkley
UNIX 4.3, AT&T UNIX 5.2, DEC VMS and Ultrix, and MS DOS, respectively.
Tile IBM-compatible PC 16-bit version requires a minimum of 512K of meinory a,s well as a
floating-point accelerator. Throughout the text, differences between the PC 16-bit version and
tile fllll version are noted. Tile PC 32-bit version running under DOS or OS/2 gives the full
capability of tile Sun or VAX versions.
The user is reminded that using HARP as a combinatorial fault tree solver is computationally
inefficient, although convenient if the user is accustomed to using HARP. However, the fault
tree is particularly useful when fault/error handling is included in the model or when sequence
dependencies are modeled. Each model is no longer combinatorial.
Chapter 2
Creation of Files
This section presents an overview of the HARP program structure, execution flow, and
tile files it generates. Textural HARP executes on DEC VAX workstations under VMS, Sun
Mierosysten_ workstations under UNIX, and IBM-('Omlmtibh_ 286, 386, and 486 PC's under
MS DOS and OS/2. Textual HARP rc_luires an ANSI standard Fortran 77 compiler and has
been compiled with lmh¢,y and Nlicr,_sofl FOIITI/AN for PC's. It is comp,til_le with a wide range
of computing platfin'ms because it was wril ten in ANSI :4 andm'd l_in'lra,, 77 for wide portal)lilly.
HARP creates AS(?II files, which are comtmtible with lllOSt computing platforms. For cxmnple,
tiles crl.ated under the PC cnvironlnent c_iu t)e executed t)y a DEC VAX. In this way, a PC can
]w ltst,([ as a workstation for input and OIlIpllt processing, and VAX can be used for large system
(-_mltmlations. tlARP has an interactive l)rolnpting input cai)at)ility and is composed of three
st,alld-al()lle programs: tdriv_, fl'fact', and ]tall)tlt.q. (See fig. 2.) As the user successively _,xeeules
the programs in this order, they create files thai are required by downstream programs.
TEXTUAL
INPUT
XHARP
TDRIVE
MARKOI
C"HA IN
(;I:'NERA IOR
HARP / MCI-ttAR_
I. IFA('E ItARPI:N(;
TRANSI'I'ION MARKOI
MATRIX (' lAIN
St(TI ,"P SOl. I 't:R
PM-ttARP
77)RIVE FII:A('I:" IIARPENG
MARKOI TRANSHTON MARKOI'
('ItALN' MATRIX ('tlAI,N'
(_t:NKRATOR SETUP SOIA "ER
CttAN(;I- MODEL
I'ARAMH'ERS
BULA
('IIANGE MODEl. /
PARAMETERS
Figure 2. HARP execution and flow relationship to GO and HARPO.
The programs also accept user-generated or modified files created with a text editor. Thus,
the user has the option to use the interactive input capability or simply input user-created files.
The input to tdrive can also come from files generated by GO. The output of textual HARP are
tabular structured files. These files can be used as input to HARPO, which allows the user to
graphically display the tabular data in a wide variety of forms in an interactive mode. Thus,
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msan overview,textual HARP is by analogythe centralprocessingunit, GO is a graphical
input to textual HARPthat bypassestextual ttARP's interactiveinput-promptingcapability,
andHARPOis the graphicaloutput processorthat readstextual HARP'stabularoutput files.(Seevols.3 and4 of this TP.)
A brief descriptionof tile filescreatedby the HARP programsis givenhere. A detailed
presentationis givenin volume1of this Te,chnicalPaper.The MODELNAMEis specifiedby
the userwhenthe programtdrive is executed. The user should avoid special characters that
are likely to interfere with the users' operating system; for example, a MODELNAME called *
would be a t)ad choice.
2.1. Files Created by tdrive
If the user input is a fault tree, then tdrive creates the following fles:
• MODELNAME.DIC A file that contains the name of each conti)onent in the model, its
symbolic failure rate, and any fault/error handling infi)rmation. This file is called the
(tictiotmry file.
• MOI)ELNAI_IE.FTt_ An interim file created by the program or the fault tree file fronl t.he
tlARP graphical input program.
• XI()I)ELNAME.INT Tit(' fault tree is eonverte(t to a Markov chain. This fib, ('()nt.ains II1(,
st,lies all(t state transitions of the Marker chain after conversi()n.
• M()I)t_;LNAME.TXT This file contains the 10xlual fault, tre(, des('ril)tion given by the user.
If the user input is a Marker chain, then tdrive (:reales the following file,s:
• MOI)ELNAME.I)IC A fih_ that, contaills the name of ea(:h ('omt)()nent in the m()(lel, ils
symbolic f'ailur(_ rate. and any f'ault/(wr()r handling in[ormati()n. This file is calh'(1 lh(,
(ti(:t.iomuy file. This fih, is optioz,d for .klarkov chain input but inq)erative fin" fault tr('('
input.
* I_I()I)EI_NAME.INT This file (:(mtains the states and state transitions of the Mark(_v chaill
as ini)ut, t)y the ust,r. An imp()rtant point for the Marker chain input: the first stale listed in
_he M()D]_LNAME.INT file musl t)e the initial state of the system. That is, if th(, lit'st line
reads STATE1 STATE2 3*LAMt3])A, then STATE1 is assumed to t)e the initial state of the
Marker chain.
2.2. Files Created by fiface
The following files are created by flfacc:
• M()DELNAME.AIA_ This file contains the all-inchlsive next faults rates if necessary;
otherwise, it is enlpty.
* MODELNAME.MAT This file contains the Sl)arse nmtrix format of the Markov chain. Row
and cohnnn values of nonzero entries are listed in ascending order.
• MODELNAME.SAM
otherwise, it is empty.
• MODELNAME.SYM
program.
• MODELNAME.USR
otherwise, it is empty.
This file contains the salne-tyi)e next faults rates if necessary;
This file contains symbol table information for the HARP engine
This file contains the user-defined next faults rates if necessary;
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2.3. Files Created by harpeng
The following files are created by harpeng:
• MODELNAME.INP This file contains the user input values for symbolic failure and repair
rates. If desired, this file can be used for future runs (called an echo file by the harpeng
program.
• MODELNAME.PT*- This file contains the unreliability values. It can be used if a plot
program is available. (The symbol * is an integer from 1 to 9.)
• MODELNAME.RS* This file contains the results of the program execution. The file lists
the values given to symbolic failure or repair rates, solution values for coverage models, failure
state probabilities (if input is a Markov chain, it can have some active state probabilities if
requested), and unreliability and reliability values and bounds information. (The symbol *
is all integer from 1 to 9.)
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Chapter 3
Fault Occurrence/Repair Model
(FORM)
This chapter addresses tit(', construction and interpretation of FORM's fi)r fiutlt trees and
Markov chains. We begin with a model of a simple systent consisting of three processors. ()ill>'
one t)rocessor is needed for lhe system to remain operational. For now, fault/error handling
mechanisms are disregarded. When a processor fails, it is simply discarded and no re('overy or
repair is attempted.
3.1. Three-Processor System Fault Tree
The fault tree input is demonstrated first. Because fault/error handling is ignored, the I:EtlM
model type none is used when entering the dictionary informal ion. After entering the dictionary
infi)rmation, the strlletllre of the model is entered as pot! rayed in the fault I rec of figure 3. \\'hen
using HARP with textual input, the user normally first skt'lehes the system fimlt tree and labels
it as S]lOWll [i1 figure 3. Each lllellll)er of tile falllt tI'('(, is labeled with a unique node IIIIlII[)(H'.
During the input dialog, l]lc llser is asked to identify tim eOlllle('liOll (if lhe fault trec melnl)ers
t)y specifying the node nmnhers. In this exmnple, the node numhers hal)pen to correspond
to the basic event comt>onent ID mmdmrs, also called the type numl)ers. Although the node
Illllll})CrS lllllSl })e lllli(tll(,, the t)asic evellt eotlll)Ollellt II)'s are 11ot FfK]llil'(.'(l tO })e lllliqlle, lhat
is, all the tmsic events can be the same type, say 1. A (_OlllpOllellt. lI) is a positive inleger thai
points to a dictionary description of lhe specified bask: event. As the user inputs the NANIE
fin' the COIll])oIlellt II), as prompted by HARP, the dictionary tile is alltOlllatically creat t,d in
ASCII forlllal and can t)(, viewed after the software l)rogralll tdri_c eOlllpleles (_xet'lltiOll. The
dictionary file contains the component name. the symbolic ['allure rate (_ for that component.
and any specified FEHM. During execution of ]_arpr!l_g, the user is asked to specit_ the failuw
distribution and its nmnerical values for each componenl. During initial model intml requested
by tdrit,c, the user is asked Io identi[v the COlllpOllellt ID for each basic event node and to
speci[v a replication factor, a posiliv,, integer. The llSe atld signiticance of the replication factor
aI'_' demonstrated in seclion 3.2.
Upon COml)letion of the firsl program tdri_c, the model has been converted to a Markov
chain, although this process is lransparent to the user. An ASCII file eontainiI_g the 5Iarkov
chain is created and identified as MODELNAME.INT. The corresponding Markov chain is shown
in figure ,i. The stat(_ 1,1,1 represents the system with each of the processors operating. With
tale _3, the third processor fails, and tim system enters the state with only the first two processors
framing, that: is, state 1,1,0. Likewise, with rate f12, the second processor fails, and the system
enters state 1.0,1. \\qth rale/_1, the first processor fails, and the system enters state 0,1,1. Now
from this state, one of two events can occur: either the second processor call fail or the third
processor can fail. The first event leaves the system in state 0,1,0 and the second event leaves the
system in state 0,0,1. Analogous transitions emanate from states 1,1,0 and 1,0,1. Once there are
two failures, (i.e., states 1,0,0; 0,1,0; and 0,0,1) the next failure crashes the systenI. Frolll these
states, F I is entered upon failure of the first processor, F2 when the second processor fails and
6 A better term is failure distribution; failure rate is used instea_i to simplify the inlm/.
7
Node 5
Node 4
Node 1 ( Node 2 +Node 3
Figure 3. Three-processor fault tree representation.
)_1
;_3
,k3 .@
Figure 4. Markov chain generated from fault tree of figure 3.
F3 when the third processor fails. The program fiface is executed to create the sparse matrix 7
data structure format needed by the HARP engine. Finally, the engine itself is executed.
The three program dialogs for the example shown in figure 4 are presented in the following
sections. In the dialogs, a program request has no special prefix, and a user response is preceded
by the symbol >.
3.1.1. tdrive Dialog for Input of Fault Tree
In the following dialog, the program tdrive creates the file 3PFTI.INT that contains the
Markov chain generated from the input fault tree. The data in the 3PFTI.INT file are always
printed in ascending row-wise order with state names being positive integers. This output is
called SORTED output. 3PFT1.DIC lists the dictionary information. Both of these files are in
7 Matrix is A(t) as described in volume 1 of this Technical Paper. A matrix is sparse when most of its entries are zero.
appendix A as is 3PFT1.TXT, which contains tile fault tree input information. Tile dialog is as
follows:
$ tdrive
> f
Modelname?
> 3pftl
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
NASA Langley Research Center/Duke University
Program Tdrive
Defaults are Invoked by "CR", Inputs are Case Insensitive
Question? ( "?" or "help" )
FAULT TREE (F) or Markov Chain (M)?
* Must be a legal filename without extension, .e.g., *
* 8 max. characters on a PC]
NAME for component ID I. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
> processorl
Symbolic failure rate?
> lambdal
Component FEHM?
> none
* Avoid using special characters *
* Numerical values are requested in fiface *
* and harpeng. Avoid using special characters *
* such as $, _, etc. *
Default Selected: FEHM Model set to "NONE"
Continue => Y Reenter => N
> y
NAME for component ID
> processor2
Symbolic failure rate?
> lambda2
Component FEHM?
> none
Default Selected: FEHM Model set to "NONE"
Continue => Y Reenter => N
> y
NAME for component ID 3.
> processor3
Symbolic failure rate?
2. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
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Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
> lambda3
ComponentFEHM?
> none
Default Selected: FEHM odelset to "NONE"
Continue=> Y Reenter=> N
> y
NAMEfor componentID 4. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
> done
Fault Tree Description.
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node i:
ComponentID? * HARPassociates an integer with each component *
• nameshownin the modelname.dicfile to simplify *
• the codeandto simplify basic event specification *
> 1
Replication factor? * Whenbasic events have the samefailure rate symbol, *
• the specification of a replication factor greatly *
• simplifies the HARPcreated Markovchain model *
> 1
Summary:Basic event node I: I of component1
Continue => Y Reenter=> N, (Default = Y)
> y
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, 7 for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node 2:
Component ID?
> 2
Replication factor?
> 1
Summary: Basic event node 2: 1 of component 2
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
> y
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
I0
Basic event node 3:
ComponentID?
> 3
Replication factor?
> 1
Summary:Basic event node 3: I of component3
Continue=> Y Reenter=> N, (Default = Y)
> y
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node 4:
Component ID?
> done
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 4: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> and
Enter number of incoming arcs: * Specify the actual number of arcs, not *
* the replicated number, i.e., for *
* Replication factor =3, specify one arc *
> 3
Enter ID number of source node for arc
> 1
Enter ID number of source node for arc
> 2
Enter ID number of source node for arc
> 3
SUMMARY: Node 4: TYPE AND
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
> y
I: * Its a good idea to first *
draw a sketch of the tree *
* labeling the nodes
* numerically,see fig. 12,
Users Guide, vol.l. *
2:
3:
3 INPUTS: 1 2 3
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
II
Node
Enter gate type:
> fbox
Enter ID numberof source nodefor arc
> 4
Summary:FBOXnode 5: INPUT: 4
Continue => Y Reenter=> N, (Default = Y)
> y
TRUNCATE the model after how many failures?
5: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
I:
> 0
Default selected: no truncation.
Include state tuples as comments in .INT file?
* State truncation bounds, *
* see sec. 3.4.2, vol. I *
* tdrive will convert the *
* fault tree into an equi- *
* valent Markov chain. State *
* tuples identify each state *
> n
Default selected: No state tuple notation.
FT2MC: Converting fault tree to Markov chain .
FT2MC: Successful completion
8 internal Markov chain states generated
7 unique nonfailure states
3 failure states generated for HARP engine
Model information in file: 3PFTI.INT
Dictionary information in file: 3PFTI.DIC
3.1.2. fiface Dialog for Fault Tree Model
* 7 merged operational *
* states were formed *
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
Program FIFACE
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$ fiface
The next step is to run fiface. Its purpose is twofold: (1) fiface puts the Markov chain into
the correct format needed by the HARP engine (a sparse matrix format with entries in column
order), and (2) fiface adds any necessary coverage information. In this example, only the first
task is applicable because no FEHM's were specified. The output files of fiface are 3PFT1.MAT,
which contains the matrix and 3PFT1.SYM, which contains symbolic information. These files
are also in appendix A. The dialog is as follows:
Modelname?
> 3pftl
Matrix and symbol table information in: 3PFTI.MAT
3.1.3.
* fiface created the *
* transition matrix , *
* see Users Guide, vol.l, *
* section 1.3 *
harpeng Dialog for Fault Tree Model Solution
Next, we runth(_engin(_harpengto obtainthesolutiontothe problenl. Tile resultsare stored
in filc 3PFTI.RS1 and are giveninappcndix A. The(lialog is as folh)ws:
$ harpeng
HARP .......................
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
Release Version 7.0 ..............
February 1993 ..................
Use an echo file from a previous run as the input file? y/n ?
> no * An echo file is automatically written by *
• the execution of harpeng which contains *
• all the input data. This file may be *
• altered with a text editor for multiple *
• executions of harpeng when the model *
• configuration is unchanged *
Modelname ?
> 3pftl
Output files:
3PFTI.RSI
3PFTI.PTI
-- Reliability and state probabilities
-- Graphics information
..... WORKING .....
3PFTI.INP -- Input file or echo of input
Declare meaning for symbol LAMBDAI ( "?" or "help" )
> 1
For constant failure rate: LAMBDAI
Nominal value?
> .001
(+/-) Variation? (Must be less than nominal. ,v- will allow reentry. )
* Variation not asked in PC 16-bit HARP version *
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> 0
Declaremeaningfor symbol LAMBDA2
> 1
For constant failure rate: LAMBDA2
Nominalvalue?
>
( "7" or "help" )
.001
(+/-) Variation7 (Mustbe less than nominal. "?" will allow reentry. )
Variation not askedin PC16-bit HARPversion
> 0
Declare meaningfor symbol LAMBDA3 ( "?" or "help" )
> 1
For constant failure rate: LAMBDA3
Nominalvalue?
> .001
(+/-) Variation? (Mustbe less than nominal. "?" will allow reentry. )
Variation not askedin PC16-bit HARPversion
> 0
Redefine symbol(s) meaningsor their values, or correct an error (y/n)?
> n
Mission time? (Hours):
> i0
Mission time reporting interval? (Hours):
> 10
ComputeParametric Boundsusing SIMPLEModel?(y/n) ? no
Boundsdisallowed in PC16-bit HARPversion
Calculating State Probabilities...
0 Reports from the GERKODEsolver. • Thenon-stiff ordinary
differential solver reports
anyunusual long solutions
Please select:
1: Scroll through the result file?
2: Solve samemodelwith newmission time or near-coincident fault rates, etc.?
S: Redefine symbol(s) meaning(s)and re-run model?
4: Exit the program?
> 4
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3.2. Variation of Three-Processor System Fault Tree
In the previous example, A1 = A2 = A3 indicates that the processors are statistically identical
components. Because we are not concerned with which processor fails (merely with the fact that
a fault has occurred), we can lump tile processors into a single basic event as demonstrated in
figure 5(a). The notation 3 * 1 designates three replications of dictionary component type 1 (the
processors in this case). The tdr'ivc program converts the fault tree to the Markov chain shown
in figure ;5([/). Notice that the number of states in the Markov chain is reduced from 10 in the
previous example to 4. State 3 represents the flflly operational system. With failure rate 3 * k
(the coefficient 3 is the number of processors available), the system makes a transition to state 2
where only two processors are available. Likewise, with rate 2, k the system goes to state 1
with only one processor and finally, the failure of the remaining processor with rate A brings the
system down.
1
+
(a) Fault tree with replicated events.
(b) Corresponding Markov chailL
Figure 5. Three-processor system.
Figure 6 shows which states are being merged in the Markov chain generated from the fault
tree of the previous example.
• • F -- -I • •
L J L __ __ J L
3 2 1
t'rocess_)rs Processors P r(messor System
available available available failed
Figure 6. Merging of three-processor Markov chain.
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The three pr()gram dialogs [or the merged fault tree example are presented in the following
sections. As in the previous example, and for all subsequ('nt examph',_, th,' oulput fih's are listed
in appendix A.
3.2.1. tdrive Dialog for Input of Merged Fault Tree
$ tdrive
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
NASA Langley Research Center/Duke University
Program Tdrive
Defaults are Invoked by "CR", Inputs are Case Insensitive
Question? ( "?" or "help" )
FAULT TREE (F) or Markov Chain (M)?
> f
Modelname?
> 3pft2
NAME for component ID
> processor
Symbolic failure rate?
> lambda
Component FEHM?
> none
Default Selected:
Continue => Y Reenter => N
> y
NAME for component ID
> done
I. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
FEHM Model set to "NONE"
2. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
Fault Tree Description.
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node i:
Component ID?
> 1
Replication factor?
> 3
Summary: Basic event node I: 3 of component 1
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
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> y
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node 2:
Component ID?
> done
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 2: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> and
Enter number of incoming arcs:
> 1
Enter ID number of source node for arc I:
> 1
SUMMARY: Node 2: TYPE AND , I INPUTS: 1
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
> y
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 3: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> fbox
Enter ID number of source node for arc I:
> 2
Summary: FBOX node 3: INPUT: 2
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
> y
TRUNCATE the model after how many failures?
> 0
Default selected: no truncation.
Include state tuples as comments in .INT file?
> n
Default selected: No state tuple notation.
FT2MC: Converting fault tree to Markov chain .
FT2MC: Successful completion
4 internal Markov chain states generated
3 unique nonfailure states
i failure states generated for HAKP engine
Model information in file: 3PFT2.INT
Dictionary information in file: 3PFT2.DIC
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3.2.2. fiface Dialog for Merged Fault Tree Model
$ fiface
Modelname?
> 3pft2
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
Program FIFACE
Matrix and symbol table information in: 3PFT2.MAT
3.2.3. harpeng Dialog for Merged Fault Tree Solution
After executing harpeng, the user should compare the results fib 3PFT2.RS1 with the
previous example 3PFT1.RS1. As expected, the unreliability values for each are identical because
A1 = A2 = A3. By merging the states, the user can greatly reduce the size of the corresponding
Markov chain and make analysis much faster (and if the model is large, can even make an
otherwise intractable solution possible).
$ harpeng
Use an echo file from a previous run as the input file?
> no
Modelname ?
> 3pft2
Output files:
3PFT2.RSI
3PFT2.PTI
HARP .......................
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
............ Release Version 7.0 .............
February 1993 .................
y/n ?
-- Reliability and state probabilities
-- Graphics information
WORKING
3PFT2.INP -- Input file or echo of input
Declare meaning for symbol LAMBDA ( "?" or "help" )
> 1
For constant failure rate: LAMBDA
Nominal value?
> .001
(+/-) Variation? (Must be less than nominal.
> 0
Redefine symbol(s) meanings or their values, or correct an error (y/n)?
> n
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"?" will allow reentry. )
Mission time? (Hours):
> 10
Mission time reporting interval? (Hours):
> I0
Compute Parametric Bounds using SIMPLE Model? (y/n) ? n
Calculating State Probabilities...
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
Please select:
i: Scroll through the result file?
2: Solve same model with new mission time or near-coincident fault rates, etc.?
3: Redefine symbol(s) meaning(s) and re-run model?
4: Exit the program?
> 4
3.3. Three-Processor System Input as a Markov Chain
We now input the three-processor system as the Markov chain of figure 7. The description of
tile chain is given in the previous example. In program tdrivc, the dictionary need not be entered
for Markov chains that do not have repair nor fault han(tling. (The dictionary must be entere(l
for a fault tree, a Markov chain with repair, or a Markov chain with coverage.) Tile program
fiface is executed to create the sparse matrix data structure forlnat neede(t by the HARP engine.
The engine, as |)efore, is run to solve the too(tel. Output files are given in appendix A.
}:iguw 7. Thrce-proc_ssor system input a_ a \L_rkov chain.
For the Markov chain input, the user is asked some different questions than h)r the fault.
tree input. When a fault trek is converted to a Markov chain in tdrive, the outtmt is always
printed in ascending row-wise order with state names being positive integers. This outpul is
called SORTED output and is printed in the MOI)ELNAME.INT file. For Markov chain inlml.
the user has tile choice of (_ntering data ill a SORTED or UNSORTED manner. If the entries
are UNSORTED, it means one of two things; either the state names are symbolic (STATE1, F1,
3P, etc.) or the entries are not in r<)w-wise ascenlling integer order. Ad<titionally, an instruction
is posted that tells the user that the first state listed must be the initial state of the system. If
this is not the case, the sohltion results can be incorrect. Next, the user is asked if the model is
to be solved AS IS. The AS IS option means that there are no fault/error handling models for
any of the components and only the FORM is to be solved.
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3.3.1.
$ tdrive
tdrive Dialog for Input of Three-Processor System
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
NASA Langley Research Center/Duke University
Program Tdrive
Defaults are Invoked by "CR", Inputs are Case Insensitive
Question? ( "?" or "help" )
FAULT TREE (F) or Markov Chain (M)?
> mc
Modelname7
> 3pmc
Will any FEHMs be used? (y/n) 7 n
Will state names be in row-wise order listed as ascending integers
beginning with 17 (i.e., no symbolic input for state names).
(y/n default = n ) 7 n
The first state entered must be the initial state,i.e., for the
line -- S1 $2 RATE .... SI" is the initial state.
Begin Markov chain entry with "read filename", or simply list
the transitions using the format: Sl S2 Rate_expression
(Enter "/d" or "done", "7" or "help")
Begin:
> 3 2 3*lambda
> 2 1 2*lamOda
> 1 F1 lambda
> done
Model information in file: 3PMC.INT
Dictionary information in file: 3PMC.DIC
3.3.2. fiface Dialog for Three-Processor System
Now run tile fiface program as before. This time the user is asked whether the model ha,s
repair (for this example, there is no repair). In addition, the user is asked whether any active
state probabilities are desired. Thus, tile user can obtain ttle probabilities for any state, not just
the failure states (as in the fault tree, SORTED, input). After running fiface, use a text editor
to compare the contents of the 3PFT2.MAT file from this run with that of the previous example
(3PFT2.MAT from section 3.2). They are the same. It serves to reason that the results files
(3PFT2.RS1) are also the same. Compare the results files in appendix A. The harpeng run is
not listed here because it is identical to the previous run. The dialog is as follows:
2O
$ fiface
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
Program FIFACE
Modelname?
> 3pmc
Model is to be solved "as is"
Matrix and symbol table information in: 3PMC.MAT
Does this model have repair? - y/n:
> n
PLEASE NOTE: THE FIRST STATE IN THE .INT
FILE IS CONSIDERED THE INITIAL STATE OF THE MODEL.
Do you want to see the state probabilities for any active states7
This information is automatically printed for any failure states. (y/n)?
> n
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Chapter 4
Fault/Error Handling Model (FEHM)
4.1. Full Model
Let us expand our three-processor example. (See fig. 7.) Each processor in states 3, 2, and 1
still fails at a constant rate )_. However, upon processor failure, the system enters tile Fault
Active state. (See fig. 8.) In this state, the system attempts to detect tile fault with a constant
detection rate h. If tile fault is detected with probability p, the faulty processor is removed and
tile system enters the state with one fewer processor. Otherwise, if the fault goes undetected, it
propagat.es through the system causing systeln failure with probability 1 -p. This single-point
failure state is recognized as state FSPF, which is a failure due to a single-point fault. If all
faults are detected, we eventually exhaust our supply of processors entering the failure state F1.
llX.( Jt ±
5*(L_ -p)
Figure 8. Three-processor system with actiw' faults.
Next, we generalize and replace the Fault Actiw_ state shown in figure 8 with a box, perhaps
containing many states, as shown in figure 9. Each box contains the "fast" transitions of fault
recow.'ry and hence is referred to as the FEHM. The FEHM captures in a few parameters the
sequence of ew.'nts that. occur within the syslem once a fault occurs. Its general structure is a
single.-entry (up to) four-exit model, which is entered when a fault occurs. The exits represent
possible outcomes o[ the attempted system recovery. As demonstrated in figure 9, the FEHM
can I)e inserted only between operational states.
\
\ /
Figure 9, Three-processor system with FEHM's inserted.
In general, what is inside the box may or may not be a single Markovian state, which is the
Fault Active state shown in figure 8. It can be as simple or as complex as the user wants. For the
moment, it does not matter what is in this box. What is important is that we analyze the FEHM
to determine the probability of successful permanent coverage-- that is, detecting the fault and
reconfiguring with one fewer processor. Accordingly, with the complementary probability, the
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systemfails. Tile path takenill the caseof a successfulreconfigurationis the C exit from the
FEHM and the path to system failure is the S exit. For this example, the contents of the FEHM
are represented by the Fault Active state of figure 8. Tile structure of tile FEHM for this example
is shown in figure 10.
Fault Occurs
FEHM C
Permanent Coverage
S
Single-Point Failure
Figure 10. Partial structure of HARP FEHM.
As shown in figure 11, tile FEttM box has been reduced to a branch point. The parameter c
(ill this case, c = p) represents tile probability of successful detection and reconfiguration. The
complementary probability parameter leading to state FSPF is denoted by an s (in this case,
,s = 1 - p). The overall model that is solved to predict the reliability of the system is shown in
figure 12.
Figure 11. Replacing FEtlM's by a branch point.
2*A * c *@ A ,@
Figure 12. Instantaneous jump model of three-processor system.
4.2. Development of Instantaneous Jump Model
The reduction from tile full model of figure 8 to the instantaneous jump model of figure 12
is the general procedure tIARP uses to solve large and stiff models. Models, such as figure 8,
with many orders of magnitude between tile slowest and fastest rates are called stiff systems.
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Weseparatetile systemalongtemporallines(with respecto occurrencetilnes)accordingto the
relativemagnitudeofthestatetransitionrates.Thestatesrepresentingfailures(slowtransitions)
aregroupedinto tile FORM and tile fast recoverystatesare groupedinto the FEHM (also
referredto asthe coveragemodel). This is the conceptof behavioraldecomposition(refs.6
and 7). Tile FEIIM is solvedin isolation,reducedto a branchpoint, and insertedinto the
FORM,asshownin the example.
Behavioraldecompositionisusednotonlyfor inodelsolutionbut alsofor modelspecification.
The userentersthe FORM and FEHM separatelyaim thus is shieldedfrom specifyinga huge
overallmodel. Note that the combinedmodel,like that of figure8, which is both stiff and
potentially large,is ne'c,_:r conslructed by' tho user nor generated by HARP. Tile solution is
designed to use a good decomposition apl)roximation so that a small nonstiff too(tel is solved
rather than a large stiff model. This largeness avoidanc(, t.ectmiqu(_ is the ha,sis of HARP.
The user shouht ensure that adequate separation (at least two orders of magnitude) occurs
between the parameters in the FORM and FEHM models. Otherwise, the results produced by
tIARP (:an produce an unacceptat)le conservative result. In the event such a condition results,
HARP issues a warning message to that effect. The degree of acceptable conservative error is
a function of the fidelity of the model, the accuracy of the input data (which is typically in
error t)y at least one order of magnitude), user requirements, and other less important factors.
Engineering judgment is the t)rinm consideration when ally modeling data are accepted.
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Chapter 5
Modeling Permanent Faults
Assume that the boxes in figure 9 now represent a subset of the CARE III single fault
model (ref. S) to demonstrate the idea of permanent faults. A fault is permanent if its faulty
manifestation persists for a long time. The time period is relative' to the criticality of the
application, so for a flight control application, a long time would be on the order of tcnlhs _f a
second. For a system such a.s that shown in figure 9. the best action upon (h_tecting a t)rocessor
with a permmwnt fault is to discard the processor. Thus, Ill(, system survives an(t funclions
with ()lie less processor. A portion of the CARE III model is 5]lO'_VIl ill figure 13.
Figure 13. Portion of CARE III singh' faulI model.
The fault is (tetecte(t with constant rate _5. Once detected, tile system removes the faully
unit and continues processing. Before detection, the fault ('_m produce an error with COllS/allt
rate p. ShouI(i the error be detecte(t with t)robability q, the presence of the fault is recognize(l
and recovery can still occur. This partial CARE model a.ssutnes that once detected, the fault is
covered all the time. This assumt)tion is demonst, rate(t by the parameter PA. Should the error
not be detected, it propagates through the system model aim causes system faihlre. This system
failure is a conservative modeling assumption and is made to simplify the model because these
failure conditions are typieally improbable. The Permanent Fault state represents the (' exit
from the FEHM leading to a degraded state, and the FAIL state corresponds to the S exit
leading to the FSPF state.
For this examt)le tile FEHM probabilities (ref. 7), when replaced by a branch point, are
(5 p
- + 5-_pqc 6+p
(probability that we take the path from the Active Fault state directly to the Detected state
multiplied by PA) + (probability of taking the path to Active Error multiplied by the probability
of going from Active Error to Detected multiplied by PA) and
P (1 q)S --
_+p
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(probability of taking path from Active Fault state to Active Error state multiplied by tile
probability of going from Active Error to FAIL state), ttowever, the }tARP user does not
have to calculate these coverage factors; they arc automatically computed by HARP based on
user-specified parameters.
Using tdrive to input this example in }tARP, we specify the fault tree or Markov chain as
in previous examples. However, we now enter the FEHM model in the dictionary. We present
this example as a fault tree; however it can just as simply be entered as a Markov chain. (See
section 3.3.) As previously noted, the *.DIC, *.TXT, *.INT, *.MAT, *.SYM, and *.RS1 files
are given in appendix A.
5.1. tdrive Dialog for Input of CARE III Permanent Single Fault
Model
$ tdrive
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
NASA Langley Research Center/Duke University
Program Tdrive
Defaults are Invoked by "CR", Inputs are Case Insensitive
Question? ( "?" or "help" )
FAULT TREE (F) or Markov Chain (M)?
> f
Modelname?
> 3pcarel
NAME for component ID I. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
> processor
Symbolic failure rate?
> lambda
Component FEHM?
> care
FEHM f ilename?
> carel.fhm
File CAREI.FHM does not currently exist
Create now? (y/n) ? y
* CARE III SINGLE FAULT MODEL (MARK0V) *
****************************************
All time parameters should be given in terms of HOURS. If you need help
or additional information, type "HELP" when prompted.
Permanent fault probability?
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>I
Enter the permanent fault model parameters (alpha and beta are both zero,
as is PB):
Delta? (rate - events/hour)
> 360
Epsilon? (rate - events/hour)
> 3600
B_ho? (rate - events/hour)
> 180
PA? (0 <= PA <= I):
> 1.0
Q? (0 <= Q <= 1):
> .999
FEHM information for this component is stored in file CAKEI.FHM
Continue => Y Keenter => N
>y
NAME for component ID 2. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
> done
Define interfering component types for near-coincident faults? (Y/N)?
> no
[Not asked in PC 16-bit HAKP version.
It's significance is explained in the
section on near-coincident faults.]
Fault Tree Description.
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node i:
Component ID?
>I
Keplication factor?
>3
Summary: Basic event node I: 3 of component 1
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
>y
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
2T
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node 2:
Component ID7
> done
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 2: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> and
Enter number of incoming arcs:
>I
Enter ID number of source node for arc i:
>i
SUMMARY: Node 2: TYPE AND , i INPUTS: 1
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
>y
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 3: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> fbox
Enter ID number of source node for arc i:
>2
Summary: FBOX node 3: INPUT: 2
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
>y
TRUNCATE the model after how many failures?
>0
Default selected: no truncation.
Include state tuples as comments in .INT file7
>n
Default selected: No state tuple notation.
FT2MC: Converting fault tree to Markov chain .
FT2MC: Successful completion
4 internal Markov chain states generated
3 unique nonfailure states
I failure states generated for HARP engine
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Model information in file: 3PCAREI.INT
Dictionary information in file: 3PCAREI.DIC
5.2. fiface Dialog for CARE III Permanent Single Fault Model
$ fiface
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
Program FIFACE
Modelname?
> 3pcarel
Matrix and symbol table information in: 3PCAREI.MAT
Which near-coincident fault rate files are to be created?
Enter:
N for NONE (ignore near-coincident faults)
A for ALL (all near-coincident faults are fatal)
S for SAMe (only faults of same type interfere)
U for USeR defined interfering component types
You can type combinations like AU, ASU, SA etc.
Combinations of "N" with A, U or S are not allowed.
[Not asked in PC 16-bit HARP version.
It's significance is explained in the
section on near-coincident faults.]
> no
Not creating any near-coincident fault rate files
5.3. harpeng Dialog for Solution of CARE III Permanent Single
Fault Model
$ harpeng
................. HARP
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
............ Release Version 7.0
.............. February 1993 .................
Use an echo file from a previous run as the input file? y/n ?
> no
Modelname ?
> 3pcarel
Output files:
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3PCAREI.RS1 -- Reliability and state probabilities
3PCAREI.PTI -- Graphics information
..... WORKING .....
3PCAREI.INP -- Input file or echo of input
Declare meaning for symbol LAMBDA ("?" or "help" )
>I
For constant failure rate: LAMBDA
Nominal value?
> 0.001
(+/-) Variation? (Must be less than nominal.
>0
Redefine symbol(s) meanings or their values, or correct an error (y/n)?
> no
Mission time? (Hours):
> i0
Mission time reporting interval? (Hours):
> I0
Calculating State Probabilities...
There were 0 Warnings from the GERK ODE solver.
Please select:
i: Scroll through the result file
2: Solve same model with new mission time or near-coincident fault rates, etc.
3: Redefine symbol(s) meaning(s) and re-run model
4: Exit the program.
>4
"?" will allow reentry. )
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Chapter 6
Modeling Transient Faults and
Transient Recovery
Until now, we have, assume(t that the only faults to be modeled are permanent. However.
certain faults can be lemt)orary in nature and not cause permanent physical damage but still
result in software errors. These faults are called tr(m,sicnt faults and the effect on the FORM
of such faults is represented in figure 14 as the transient restoration transition. Once a fault
is diagnosed as transient and recovery froin such a fault is successflfl, the system returns to an
operational mode without reconfiguring the syslem, thai is, a hardware module is not remow_d
from the system. Transient faults can be modeled I)y using the Direct ARIES, CARE llI,
and ESPN FEttM's. These models allow the user to model specific system behaviors resulting
from the occurrence of transient faults. The particular choice of FEHM depends on the system
application and its susceptit)ility to transients. The other FEHX['s, the prot)ability and moments,
probability and distributions, and probability and emI)irical data, can also 1)e used to account
for transient faults, but no FEHM modeling detail is allowed.
Fault Occurs
I{
._____
Transient
Restorat ion
FEH[M
C
P('.rlnaIl(mI
Cov(_ra_('
S
Single-Point Failure
Figure 1,I. Partial structure of HARP FEtIM.
The incorporation of transient faults in our three-processor example is shown in figure 15.
While this figure appears similar to figure 9, the boxes now show a transition back to the state
from which the box was entered, corresponding to transient restoration.
/" F
Figure 15. Three-processor system with FEHM's showing the C, S, and R exits.
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6.1. Direct Coverage Values Model
If the user chooses, the coverage values can be input directly either in the .fi.face program or
t,he harpeng program. In this case the FEHM type is VALUES. Wh(m Wompted for the FEHM
type in program tdr'ive, the user should respond with the kcyword VALUES. No input file is
used; instead, in fiface the user is given the option of entering the specific values for (7 and R.
If they are not entered in fiface, they are requested in harpen 9. The value for S is calculated as
(1 -C- R).
6.2. ARIES Transient Recovery Model
To denlonstrate the modeling of transient faults, assume the boxes in figure 15 now represent
the ARIES model (ref. 9). (See fig. 16.) ARIES is a phased recovery model that allows the user
to specify how many phases comprise the recovery procedure.
Fault
Occurs
PE 1 = CR
(I-CR) PR I
PF
Phase
NP
PR i
PENp+ I
System Normal
Crash
Fault
c
R
Figure 16. ARIES transient fault recovery model.
In each phase of the recovery, the duration of which is constant, the system attempts
recovery. If successful, the system returns to the Normal Processing state without discarding
any components. If the recovery in a particular phase is unsuccessful, the next phase attempts
to locate and recover from the fault. If all phases are ineffective, the fault is assumed to be
permanent. We discard the faulty component and continue running with one fewer component
(provided that we still have enough to leave the system operational). If the fault is a critical
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one from whichthe systemasa wholecannotrecover,the SystemCrashstate is enteredby
the transitionarc labeled(with probability) 1- CR. This state represents the S exit from the
FEHM and the "Permanent Fault Recovery" state represents the C exit. The transient faults,
leaving the FEHM via exit R, are realized by state Normal Processing.
The exit probability calculations s for the ARIES model are as follows:
c = (PENp + 1X c°v)
where
NP
s =(1 -- CR)+(PENP+IX1 - coy)+ _ PF i
i=l
NP
r = _ PRi
i=l
PF i -_ PEi(1- exp-P Ti)
These calculations are performed by the HARP program and not by the user. The user-input
data for the ARIES model are delineated in the following example as annotations enclosed in
square brackets. For this example, we provide only the coverage model input. Like the previous
example, the model is input in program tdrive. Because the output files from tdrive and fifacc are
similar to previous runs, the harpeng output file 3PARIES1.RS1 and the FEHM file ARIES.FHM
are listed in appendix A.
6.3. tdrive Dialog for Input of ARIES Model
*******$****$***************************
* ARIES TRANSIENT FAULT RECOVERY MODEL *
,_***********************************_**
Enter number of recovery phases (int, max I0): [NP]
>3
Transient fault probability?
> .9
Transient fault mean duration? (in seconds):
> . 005
Catastrophic fault probability, given that a fault occurs?
> .001
Duration of each recovery phase? (seconds):
[I-CR]
[Ti, deterministic time,
conservative assumption]
Phase 1:
> .8
8 Parameter coy is an enhancement to the original ARIES FEHM model in recognition that after the system determines
the fault is permanent, some recovery action is necessary. The success of that action is specified by cov, a probability.
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Phase 2:
> .2
Phase 3:
> .I
Recovery effectiveness probability of each phase? [PR(i)]
Phase i:
> .8
Phase 2:
> .7
Phase 3:
> .5
Failure rate of the recovery system hardware (in seconds): [p]
0.0
Coverage of permanent fault recovery procedure: (probability) [cov]
> .85
FEHM information for this component is stored in file ARIES.FHM
6.4. CARE III Transient Single Fault Model
Tile CARE III single fault model can be expanded to model transient and intermittent
faults. As figure 17 shows, permanent faults are still modeled in the same manner as
previously described, with a = _ = PB ----0. (The user is never permitted to enter these default
parameters.) For the transient model, the fault can now be either active or benign. Once
the fault enters the Benign Fault state, it is assumed to have disappeared before the system
experienced any ad _erse effects (13 -- 0). The disappearance of the transient signifies that the
FEHM exit R is being taken. Again, in the Active Error state, the transient can go benign.
If the error is detected (with probability q), the faulty element is removed from service with
probability PB.
With the complementary probability, the fault is assumed to be transient and the element
is returned to service without reconfiguring the system. If the error is detected from the
Active Error state, the faulty element is removed from service with probability PA. With the
complementary probability, we remain in the FEHM because the fault is still present. Note, the
two Detected states and the Benign state (for the transient model) are instantaneous states, as
denoted by the dotted transitions leaving them. By setting c_ > 0 and fi > 0, we can also model
intermittent faults. (See the following section.)
The next section lists the dialog for the input of the coverage model in program tdrive: The
FEHM file 3PCARE2.FHM and the harpeng output file 3PCARE2.RS1 are listed in appendix A.
Using the CARE FEHM example to model transient faults, we let the parameter a be large in
relation to the values of p and 6. Once again, the calculation of the exit probabilities C, R, and S
is performed automatically by HARP, and each occurrence of the CARE III FEHM is replaced
by a three-way branch point.
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_ Active
Faull
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\
\
PB
'AFigure 17. Complete C RE III single fault model.
6.5. tdrive Dialog for Input of CARE III Transient Single Fault
Model
****************************************
* CARE III SINGLE FAULT MODEL (MARKOV) *
All time parameters should be given in terms of HOURS. If you need help
or additional information, type "HELP" when prompted.
Permanent fault probability?
>0
Intermittent fault probability?
>0
Transient fault probability is: i.0000000000000
Enter the transient fault model parameters
(alpha is positive but beta is zero):
Alpha? (rate - events hour)
> 36000
Delta? (rate - events/hour)
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> 360
Epsilon? (rate - events/hour)
> 3600
Rho? (rate - events/hour)
> 180
PAT (0 <= PA <= i):
> .5
PB? (0 <= PB <= i):
> .5
Q? (0 <= Q <= 1):
> .9
FEHM information for this component is stored in file CARE2.FHM
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Chapter 7
Intermittent Faults in Coverage Model
7.1. Overview
A third class of faults known as intermittent faults can be modeled. These faults are
particularly insidious as they are always present but not always active. In the active state,
the intermittent fault causes the system to operate incorrectly; however, in the benign state, the
intermittent fault does not affect the operation of the system. The fault can switch between the
active and benign states at any time (c_ > 0 and _ > 0). The FEHM model, like in the transient
case, has the C, S, and R exits. (See fig. 14.) The C exit is used when the intermittent is treated
as a permanent fault, the S exit is used when the fault has produced an error from which the
system cannot recover, and the R exit is used when the intermittent is treated as a transient.
(That is, the time between activations of the intermittent fault can be long an(] results in the
incorrect assumption that the fault is a transient.)
The CARE III single fault model again provides us a good example for which we provide
the coverage model input. In previous examples demonstrating the CARE II[ FEHM model,
we stated that the particular fault type that we are modeling is going to occur 100 percent of
the time; that is, the model is the permanent fault. This model is selected when answering the
following questions:
"A Fault is Permanent with what probability? "
"A Fault is Intermittent with what probability? "
For the permanent model, we responded 1.0 to the first question, and for the transient model,
we responded 0.0 to both questions (thus making the transient model a default of 1.0). Rather
than determining that only one type of fault is likely', perhaps we have stu(tied our system and
found that all three fmfit types are possible. We can reflect this in our model during the input.
As in the previous two examples, the FEItM file 3PCARE3.FItM and the harpcng outtmt file
3PCAREg.RS1 are given in appendix A.
7.2. tdrive Dialog for CARE III Intermittent Single Fault Model
**_****_****_****_*_***_***_**********_*
* CARE III SINGLE FAULT MODEL (MARKOV) *
*$*$**$*$$****$$$******$****$***$$*$*$$*
All time parameters should be given in terms of HOURS. If you need help
or additional information, type "HELP" when prompted.
Permanent fault probability?
> .2
Intermittent fault probability?
> .2
Transient fault probability is: 0.60000000000000
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Enter the permanent fault model parameters (alpha and beta are both zero,
as is PB):
Delta? (rate - events/hour)
> 300
Epsilon? (rate - events/hour)
> 3600
Rho? (rate - events/hour)
> 240
PA? (0 <= PA <= I):
>i
Q? (0 <= q <= i):
> .999
Enter the intermittent fault model parameters:
Alpha? (rate - events/hour)
> 2100
Beta? (rate - events/hour)
> 3000
Delta? (rate - events/hour)
> 360
Epsilon? (rate - events/hour)
> 3600
Kho? (rate - events/hour)
> 180
PA? (0 <= PA <= I):
> .9
PB? (0 <= PB <= I):
> .i
Q? (0 <= Q <= I):
> .999
Enter the transient fault model parameters
(alpha is positive but beta is zero):
Alpha? (rate - events/hour)
> 36000
Delta? (rate - events/hour)
> 180
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Epsilon? (rate - events/hour)
> 3600
Kho? (rate - events/hour)
> 180
PA? (0 <= PA <= 1):
> .5
PB? (0 <= PB <= 1):
> .5
Q? (0 <= Q <= 1):
> .999
FEHM information for this component is stored in file CARE3.FHM
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Chapter 8
ESPNFEHM
One additional coverage model is available to the user, an Extended Stochastic Petri Net
(ESPN). (See refs. 10 to 13.) As shown in figure 18, this FEHM models three aspects of a fault
recovery process: physical fault behavior, transient recovery, and permanent recovery.
S _
Fault
TI
t
Permanent [ntermittenl
T2
T6
Error
T9
Delected
l-q
Point
T5
Counter
TIO k
TII
Figure 18. HARP ESPN single fault model.
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Thefault behaviormodelcapturesthe physicalstatusof the fault, suchaswhetherthefault
isactiveor benign(if permanentor intermittent),or whetherthe fault still exists(if transient).
Oncethefault isdetected,it is temporarilyassmnedto betransient,andanappropriaterecovery
procedurecancommence.Thetransientrecoveryprocedurecanbeattemptedmorethan once.
If the detection/recoverycycleis repeatedtoo many times,a permanentrecoveryprocedure
(reconfiguration)is invoked.If the reconfigurationis successful,the systemis againoperating
correctly,althoughin a somewhatdegradedstate.
8.1. ESPN Specification
The inherent concurrency between the actual fault behavior and tile system's fault/error
handling behavior can be captured effectively in terms of an ESPN (ref. 14). Recall tile
composition of a Petri net (PN) bipartite graph: (ref. 15) a set of places P (drawn as circles), a
set of transitions T (drawn as bars), and a set of directed arcs A, which connect transitions to
places or places to transitions. Places can contain tokens _J(drawn a,s dots). The state of a PN,
called the PN marking, is defined by tile number of tokens contained in each place.
A place is an input to a transition when an arc exists from the place t.o the transition, an¢t
a place is an output from a transition when an arc exists fl'om tile transition to the place. A
transition is enabled when each of it.s input places contains at least, one token. !"nable¢t transitions
can fire, by removing one token from each input place and placing one token in each output plac¢_.
Thus, the firing of a transition causes a change of state (produces a different marking) for the
PN.
A Stochastic Petri Net (ref. 16) is obtained by associating with each Iransition a s(>-ealled
firing time. Once a transition is enabled, an exponentially distributed amount of time elapses.
If the transition is still enabled, it then fires. A Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (ref. 17) allows
immediate (zero firing time) a,s well as timed transitions, hmncdiate transitions are drawn as
thin bars, timed transitions as thick bars.
An ESPN allows firing times to belong to an arbitrary distribution. Some other exlvnsions
to Petri nets are considered here. An inhibitor arc from a place to a transition has a small
circle rather than an arrowhead at the transition. The firing rule is changed as follows. A
transition is enabled when tokens are present in all of its (normal) input places and no lokens
are present in tile inhibited input places. When the transitio_ tires, tile tokens are removed from
the normal input places and deposited ill the output places as usual, but tile number of tokens
in the inhibited input place remains zero.
A probabilistic are: from a transition to a set of output places deposits a token in one (and
only one) of tile places in tile set. Tile choice of which place receives tile token is determined by
tile probability labels on each branch of the arc.
A counter arc from a place to a transition is labeled with an integer value k. This the integer
value changes the firing rule such that a transition is enabled when tokens are present in all of
its (normal) input places and at lea,st k tokens are present in the counter input place. When the
transition fires, one token is removed from each normal input place, while k tokens are removed
from tile counter input place. Associated with a particular counter arc can be a counter alternate
arc, which enables an alternate transition when the count is between 1 and k - 1, inclusive. The
alternate transition can fire each time a token is deposited in the counter input place until
k tokens are present. The count remains unchanged by the firing of the alternate transition
because it removes no token from the counter input place. A counter alternate arc is labeled
with a k. Neither the counter arc nor the counter alternate arc are true extensions to Petri
9 A token is a marker that designates flow of model processes.
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nets,asbothcanbe realizedby a cascadeof normalplacesandtransitions.Rather,the arcsare
usefulshorthandnotationsfor sucha cascade.
8.2. ESPN Model in HARP
When a fault occurs in the system, a token is deposited in the place labeled Fault. This
token enables the transition T_. The transition fires immediatel); thus removing a token from the
input place. Depending upon whether the fault is permanent, intermittent, or transient, a token
is then deposited in place Permanent, Active Intermittent, or Transient, with probability p,
i, or t, respectively. (These probabilities are user-input values.) Simultaneously, a token is
deposited in place Fault Exists, which represents the presence of an as yet undetected fault. If
the fault is permanent, the token remains in the Permanent place until the model is exited. If
tile fault is intermitt_'rlt, the token that was deposited in Active Intermittent circulates between
places Active Intermittent and Benign Intermittent, thus representing the oscillation of the
fault between the active and benign states. If the fault is transient, eventually the token
that was deposited in place Transient is passed to place Transient Gone, which represents the
disappearance of the fault. Note that if a token exists in both places Transient Gone and Fault
Exists, transition T5 can fire. This condition represents a transient fault that disappears before
its presence is felt.
While the fault is active and still exists (i.e., a token exists in place Fault Exists and no
token in either places Benign Intermittent or Transient Gone), two things can happen: an error
can be produced or the fault can be detected directly. These two events are represented by
transitions T6 and TT, respectively. If the self-test procedure is run while the fault is active,
then the fault is detected with probability d. Once an error is produced, it is detected with
probability q, or it propagates through the system and causes a system failure.
Once the fault is detected, a token is deposited in place Counter, which serves as a counter for
the nunfi)er of times transient recovery ha_s been attempted. As long as fewer than k tokens are
in place Counter, transient recovery can begin. When recovery is completed, the fault can still
exist, and the detection/recovery cycle can repeat. If recovery is completed and the transient
fault is gone, T5 fires, and the system is once again functioning correctly. If the recovery has
completed and the intermittent fault has become benign, transitions T6 and T7 wait for the
fault to become active again before they are enabled.
If the fault is detected too often (more than k times), the fault is then assumed to be
t)(,rmanent in nature, and no automatic recovery process begins. This condition is modeled by the
accumulation of k tokens in place Counter. Once k tokens are present, transition Tll is disabled
(transient recovery procedures are inhibited) and transition 3"12 is enabled (permanent recovery
procedures begin). Once the fault is determined to be permanent, a diagnostic procedure is
invoked to isolate the faulty unit; this condition is represented by a token in place Locate.
The diagnostic procedure is successful with probability 1. If the faulted unit is isolated,
the system attempts automatic reconfiguration, which is represented by place Reconfigure.
Reconfiguration is successful with probability r and the token is passed to place Permanent
Coverage, which represents the system again operating correctly, although performance can be
somewhat degraded.
The user input to this submodel axe the distributions of times for each transition, and the
probabilities of correct error detection q, fault detection d, fault location l, and reconfiguration r.
(Note that the distributions need not be exponential.) The user must also provide the number
of attempts at transient recovery k- 1, the percentage of faults that are permanent p, the
percentage of faults that are transient t, and, since this model is simulated for solution the
confidence level and percent error desired. The distributions available are constant, k-stage
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Erlang, exponential, gamma, log-normal, normal. Rayleigh, unifornl, and \Veitmll. For more
information on any of these distributions, see reference 18.
This FEHikl is the only model that is simulated for solution. During the simulation, a
statistical analysis of the simulation data is performe(t. The confidence intervals at)out the exit
probabilities are generated for the R and C exits and arc compared with the allowable error.
The S exit data is determined to t)c S = 1 - R - C. If the confidence interval is 1oo wide, tile
nmnber of trials is inerease(t (|)y a factor of 2). \Vhen the simulation has reached the (tcsired
accuracy, the results are appen(led to the parameter file. Tile ESPN simulator uses a random
mmlher generator whose se(_(l is linked to the host system clock. Thus, model state prot)ai)ilities
change with each new execution of HARP, even when the salllO input data are used. The ilser
cannot replicate the results for the following example, which is listed in the at)pcndix, mfless the
randolph nunll)er seed is set. (See vol. 1 of this TP.)
For this me(tel, t lm coverage factor R is the probability of a token reaching the place labeled
"Transient I_estoration"; C is the i)rol)a|)ility of a token reaching the place labeled "Permanent
Coverage"; and S is th(_ probability of a token reaching the place labeled "Single Point Failure."
The %urth factor, N is derived from the relative passage time to the three exits, _ has t)cen
described previously.
To demonstrate the use el the ESPN model, the three-processor, two-bus system is used.
The FORM input is left to the reader (either as a fault tree or a Markov chain) and the output
files arc listed in the appendix. For this example the hau)e_g program is run four times utilizing
the four (tifferent near-coincident fault type options. Tile results for the four rmm arc recorded
in the files with extensions .RS1, .RS2, .I{$3, an(t .RS4. Like our first examples, the complete
prograin runs arc listed along with a sample input ESPN model. The ESPN parainetcr file is
printed twice in appendix A |)oth before and after tile solution program is run. The simulation
results ot)taincd during the execution of havpcng are printed directly in the parameter file. In
this way_ mflcss tim input parameters c|lallge, the simulation is not rllll again.
8.2.1. tdrive Dialog for ESPN Model
$ tdrive
> f
HARP---Version 7.0, February 1993
NASA Langley Research Center/Duke University
Program Tdrive
Defaults are Invoked by "CR", Inputs are Case Insensitive
@uestion? ( "?" or "help" )
FAULT TREE (F) or Markov Chain (M)?
Modelname?
> 3p2b
NAME for component ID
> processor
Symbolic failure rate7
> lambda
I. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
Component FEHM?
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> espn
FEHMfilename?
> espn.fhm
File ESPN.FHM doesnot currently exist
Create now? (y/n) ? y
HARP ESPN COVERAGE MODEL *
All times are in units of SECONDS
Transition numbers refer to ESPN figure in manual
Active to benign transition distribution? (T3)
Distribution type:
> help
Valid dists are:
uniform
exponential
Weibull
normal
Rayleigh
log Normal
Erlang (k-stage Erlang)
constant value
please try again
Distribution type:
> unif
Lower limit (seconds):
> 0
Upper limit (seconds) :
> 1
Transient fault lifetime distribution? (T4)
Distribution type :
> exp
lambda (rate parameter, events second) :
> I00
Benign to active transition distribution? (T2)
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Distribution type:
> unif
Lowerlimit (seconds):
> 0
Upperlimit (seconds):
> .5
Detect transition distribution (self-test)? (T7)
Distribution type:
> unif
Lower limit (seconds):
>0
Upper limit (seconds) :
> .4
Fraction of faults detected (d)?
> .9
Production of errors distribution? (T6)
Distribution type :
> weibull
Scale parameter (rate, events/second):
> I0
Shape parameter? (alpha)
>2.5
Error propagation or detection distribution? (T9)
Distribution type :
> weib
Scale parameter (rate, events/second):
> 5O
Shape parameter? (alpha)
> .25
Fraction of errors detected? (q)
> .9
Transient recovery attempts? (k-l)
> 5
Transient recovery distribution? (T8)
Distribution type :
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> erlang
Rateparameter (events/second):
> 100
Numberof stages (positive integer):
> 2
Fraction of isolated detected faults? (i)
> .9
Isolation time distribution? (T13)
Distribution type:
> normal
Mean(seconds):
> 4
Standarddeviation (seconds):
> 1
Fraction of successful reconfigurations? (r)
> .9
Keconfiguration time distribution? (TI4)
Distribution type:
> normal
Mean(seconds):
> 1
Standarddeviation (seconds):
> .5
Fraction of transient faults? (t)
> .5
Fraction of permanentfaults? (p)
> .4
Confidencelevel? (choosefrom 60,65,70,75,80,85,90,95,98,
-- suggestedvalue is 95)
> 9O
Percenterror tolerated in the exit probabilities? (integer value --
suggest value between2 and 5)
> 10
FEHMinformation for this componentis stored in file ESPN.FHM
Continue => Y Reenter => N
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>y
NAMEfor componentID
> bus
Symbolicfailure rate?
> mu
ComponentFEHM?
> values
Continue => Y Reenter => N
>y
NAME for component ID
> done
2. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
3. Enter "/d" or "done" if finished.
Define interfering component types for near-coincident faults? (Y/N)?
>y
I PROCESSOR LAMBDA ESPN.FHM
2 BUS MU VALUES
When prompted for each component,enter the number of each dictionary ID
that is an interfering component type.
Separate entries by commas, _.e., 1,2.
Type "ALL" to specify all components.
Type "NONE" to specify no components.
Type "?" or"HELP" to see the dictionary again.
What components will cause the PROCESSOR to fail
>2
Fault Tree Description.
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node i:
Component ID?
>i
Replication factor?
>3
Summary: Basic event node I: 3 of component 1
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
>y
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
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or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node 2:
ComponentID?
>2
Replication factor?
>2
Summary:Basic event node 2: 2 of component2
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
>y
Enter "/d" or done" for gate/box entry, ? for dictionary,
or "/X" to correct input error.
Basic event node 3:
Component ID?
> done
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 3: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBDX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> and
Enter number of incoming arcs:
> 1
Enter ID number of source node for arc
> 1
SUMMARY: Node 3 : TYPE AND
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
>y
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 4: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> and
Enter number of incoming arcs:
> 1
Enter ID number of source node for arc i:
>2
SUMMARY : Node 4 : TYPE AND , i INPUTS : 2
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* arc is given here.
1:
1 INPUTS: 1
* Since replication = 3 *
* was specified, only I *
* See note directly above *
Continue=> Y Reenter=> N, (Default = Y)
>y
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 5: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> or
Enter number of incoming arcs:
>2
Enter ID number of source node for arc I:
>3
Enter ID number of source node for arc 2:
>4
SUMMARY: Node 5: TYPE OR , 2 INPUTS: 3 4
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
>y
Enter "/X" to correct input error, ? for help.
Node 6: Gate or Box or Fbox (Enter "FBOX" as last node)
Enter gate type:
> fbox
Enter ID number of source node for arc I:
>5
Summary: FBOX node 6: INPUT: 5
Continue => Y Reenter => N, (Default = Y)
>y
TRUNCATE the model after how m_y failures?
>0
Default selected: no truncation.
Include state tuples as comments in .INT file?
>n
Default selected: No state tuple notation.
FT2MC: Converting fault tree to Markov chain .
FT2MC: Successful completion
Ii internal Markov chain states generated
6 unique nonfailure states
2 failure states generated for HARP engine
Model information in file: 3P2B.INT
Dictionary information in file: 3P2B.DIC
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8.2.2. fiface Dialog for ESPN Model
$ fiface
HARP - Version 7.0, February 1993
Program FIFACE
Modelname?
> 3p2b
Matrix and symbol table information in: 3P2B.MAT
Which near-coincident fault rate files are to be created?
Enter:
N for NONE (ignore near-coincident faults)
A for ALL (all near-coincident faults are fatal)
S for SAMe (only faults of same type interfere)
U for USeR defined interfering component types
You can type combinations like AU, ASU, SA etc. *If more than one multi- *
Combinations of "N" with A, U or S are not allowed.*fault model is required *
•when multiple harpeng *
•executions are made, *
•specify them here. fiface*
> asu *will create .ALL,.SAM, *
• or .USR files for harpeng*
Enter probabilities now for component with failure rate MU? (y/n) ?
>y
The upper bounds of C and R and lower bounds of S and N should add to one.
The lower bounds of C and R and upper bounds of S and N should add to one.
Also the nominal values of C, N, R, S should add to I.
Probability of C2 ?
> .5
Variat ion?
> 0
Probability of R2 ?
> .3
Variation?
> 0
Probability of $2 ?
> .2
Variation?
> 0
Probability of N calculated to be:
Variation of N calculated to be:
0.000000
0.000000
5O
8.2.3. harpeng Dialog for ESPN Model
$ harpeng
HARP
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
Release Version 7.0
February 1993
Use an echo file from a previous run as the input file? y/n ?
> no
Modeln_me ?
> 3p2b
Output files:
3P2B.RSI
3P2B.PTI
-- Reliability and state probabilities
-- Graphics information
WORKING
3P2B. INP -- Input file or echo of input
Choose the near-coincident fault rate to be used
for the coverage factor calculations.
I: NONE (ignore near-coincident faults).
2: ALL-inclusive (all near-coincident faults are fatal)
3: SAMe-component (only faults of same type interfere).
4: Interfering component types (USeR-defined types).
> i
Declare meaning for symbol LAMBDA ( "?" or "help" )
> 1
For constant failure rate: LAMBDA
Nominal value?
> .5e-2
(+/-) Variation? (Must be less than nominal.
> 0
Declare meaning for symbol MU ( "?" or "help" )
> 1
For constant failure rate: MU
Nominal value?
> .5e-I
(+/-) Variation? (Must be less than nominal.
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"?" will allow reentry. )
"?" will allow reentry. )
>0
Redefine symbol(s) meaningsor their values, or correct an error (y/n)?
>n
Mission time? (Hours):
> i0
Mission time reporting interval? (Hours):
> I0
Compute Parametric Bounds using SIMPLE Model? (y/n) ? n
Simulating ESPN Fault/Error Handling Model ...
Calculating State Probabilities...
i Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
Please select:
I: Scroll. through the result file?
2: Solve same model with new mission time or near-coincident fault rates, etc.?
3: Redefine symbol(s) meaning(s) and re-run model?
4: Exit the program?
>2
Choose the near-coincident fault rate to be used
for the coverage factor calculations.
I: NDNE (ignore near-coincident faults).
2: ALL-inclusive (all near-coincident faults are fatal)
3: SAMe-component (only faults of same type interfere).
4: Interfering component types (USeR-defined types).
>2
Redefine symbol(s) meanings or their values, or correct an error (y/n)?
>n
Mission time? (Hours):
> i0
Mission time reporting interval? (Hours):
> I0
Compute Parametric Bounds using SIMPLE Model? (y/n) ? n
Calculating State Probabilities...
I Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
Please select:
i: Scroll through the result file?
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2: Solve same model with new mission time or near-coincident fault rates, etc.?
3: Redefine symbol(s) meaning(s) and re-run model?
4: Exit the program?
>2
Choose the near-coincident fault rate to be used
for the coverage factor calculations.
I: NONE (ignore near-coincident faults).
2: ALL-inclusive (all near-coincident faults are fatal)
3: SAMe-component (only faults of same type interfere).
4: Interfering component types (USeR-defined types).
>3
Redefine symbol(s) meanings or their values, or correct an error (y/n)?
>n
Mission time? (Hours):
> I0
Mission time reporting interval? (Hours):
> 10
Compute Parametric Bounds using SIMPLE Model? (y/n) ? n
Calculating State Probabilities...
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
Please select:
I: Scroll through the result file?
2: Solve same model with new mission time or near-coincident fault rates, etc.?
3: Redefine symbol(s) meaning(s) and re-run model?
4: Exit the program?
>2
Choose the near-coincident fault rate to be used
for the coverage factor calculations.
I: NONE (ignore near-coincident faults).
2: ALL-inclusive (all near-coincident faults are fatal)
3: SAMe-component (only faults of same type interfere).
4: Interfering component types (USeR-defined types).
>4
Redefine symbol(s) meanings or their values, or correct an error (y/n)?
>n
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Mission time? (Hours):
> I0
Mission time reporting interval? (Hours):
> I0
Compute Parametric Bounds using SIMPLE Model? (y/n) ? n
Calculating State Probabilities...
Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
Please select:
i: Scroll through the result file?
2: Solve same model with new mission time or near-coincident fault rates, etc.?
3: Redefine symbol(s) meaning(s) and re-run model?
4: Exit the program?
>4
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Chapter 9
Incorporation of Near-Coincident
Faults
9.1. Overview
HARP is designed with the capability to model highly reliable systems. To approt)riatcly do
so, the possibility of modeling tile effects of near-coincident faults is included. A near-coincident
fault is one that occurs before tile coverage model has recovered from a single fault. How
disastrous the results are depends upon how tile user chooses to interpret the effects of the
near-coincident fault. Typically, the user models the effect of a near-coincident fault as a system
failure. This conservative assumption is often used to eliminate the user burden of acquiring
hard-to-get data and to simplii_'_, the model. HARP offers a number of multifault models to cover
the near-coincident fault effect, that is, system failure.
The FEHM's are specified in the same manner as before, supplying the C, S, and R exit
probat)ilities. Until now, these exit probabilities have been obtained with no time limit on the
recovery procedure. However, if a second fault occurs before reaching an exit then we are faced
with the problem of two existing faults. Because the second fault can crash the system, we
ideally want the FEtIM (coverage model) to exit before the second, near-coincident fault occurs;
however, for highly reliat)le systems, the probability of a second fault occurring in the recovery
interval is often a significant t)ortion of the total system failure probability. The near-coincident
fault model allows the user to account for pairs of faults that are likely to cause total system
failure.
When these mo(lels were I)eing developed over a decade ago, the developers believed that a
more complex model allowing more than two near-coincident faults would be of little practical
use and would not justify the additional computational burd(m for the aircraft, flight c(mtrol
at)plication. As electroni(: devices t)ecame more r('liable during that decade and continue to
do so, the developers' assumption t)roved correct. Most coimnercial and military aircraft flight
control systems and most existing systems in commercial use today can be effectively modeled
wh(m the near-coinci(lent fault is a mission critical factor. Systems using computers call have up
to four reconfigurable processing units where a majority vote can be effected until two coexisting
faults occur. When systems incorporate more than four voting processors and the near-coinci(ient
fault is a significant factor, tile HARP multifault models produce a conservative approximation
that |)c(!olnes inore conserw_tive as tile number of processors increases.
During that same decade, electronic microcomputers have also become more computationally
powerflll and cost has dropl)ed significantly, ushering in the development of distributed comput-
ers. Tile commercial transport industry's interest is shifting away from the task of creating
-highly reliable systems (now achievable) toward highly available distributed systems to reduce
maintenance costs and to garner greater computational resources. Such systems may need to
tolerate more than two near-coincident faults, and the automatic HARP near-coincident model
may become too conservative. Two options are available. The user can edit the HARP generated
ASCII files to correct the next fault rates to the exact, ones in files *.ALL, *.SAM, or *.USR
(as appropriate), and if necessary, edit the *.MAT files to add additional state transitions as
necessary. An exact Markov chain model can be obtained in this manner. An alternative is to
use the extended behavioral decomposition multifault model implemented in X-Window System
HARP (XHARP) (ref. 5). Volume 1 of this Technical Paper provides more details.
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Figure 19. Structure of HARP FEItM.
The coverage model is still solved in isolation; not only the probability of reaching the R, C,
and S exits but also the time to reach each exit are calculated. If we know (probabilistically) when
a near-coincident fault occurs and also the time to reach the R, C, and S exits, we can determine
whether one of these exits is reached before the near-coincident fault. A fourth exit N is added to
the coverage model leading to a new failure state labeled FNCF (failure near-coincident fault).
(See fig. 19.) Tile probabilities r, c, and s are now adjusted since the exits must be reached
before a certain time. Therefore, N = (1 - C - R - S). (See vol. 1 of this TP for tile derivation
of C, R, and S.)
Again, we automatically incorporate the possibility of imperfect coverage into the perfect
coverage Markov chain, as subsequently shown in our three-processor example. Unlike the
previous figures of the three-processor system, the FEHM's here have four exits. Note, too, that
the exit probabilities are now distinct for FEHM 1 and FEHM 2 (fig. 20) because the next fault
rates are state dependent.
r3 r2
Figure 20. Three-processor system showing FEHM's with C, S, R, and N exit probabilities.
While in the coverage model denoted by FEHM 1, a second processor fault is possible with
rate 2*A. Therefore, one of the exits, R, C, or S must be reached before time to the second fault
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(whichisanexponentiallydistrihutedrandomvariablewith parameter2,,_) if a near-coincidenI
fault is to be avoided. Likewise, while in tile coverag(' model denoted by FEtt5I 2, another
processor failure can occur with rate A.
Assume that FEHM 1 and FEHM 2 in figure 20 are exponentially distributed delays with
rate _ (see fig. 21). Thus, s = i" = 0. Note that in the absence of a near-coincident fault, c = 1.
However, with the near-coincident fault occurring at the rate 2. A from FEHM 1, tile probatfility
of a successful C exit before the occurrence of a second near-coincident fault is easily shown to
be c3 - 3--+2.A'
Figure 21. Three-processor system showing n(,ar-coinci(h, nt faults.
Similarly for FEHM 2, c2 = _. The instantaneous junlp model is shown in figure 21.
Figure 22. Instantaneous jump model of three-processor system with n(,ar-coincidcnt faults.
In figure 22, n:l = 1 -- c 3 and n2 = 1 - c2. Thus, the inclusion of near-coincident faults causes
the coverage values to become state dependent. The HARP program automatically derives the
coverage factors by taking the Laplace transform of the time-to-exit distributions. We compute
the transforms for the single fault model and then substitute the second near-coincident fault
rate for the Laplace transform variable to obtain the state-dependent coverage values. If the
time-to-exit distribution is not available in closed form, a Taylor series expansion of the Laplace
transform yields an expression that depends on powers of the next fault rate and on the moments
of the distribution. These moments are easily obtained from empirical or simulation data. See
reference 6 for the mathematical derivations.
We need not restrict ourselves to single-state FEHM's. Let us again look at a portion of
the CARE III coverage model that was introduced in chapter 4 on permanent faults. While
essentially the same model as figure 13, the instantaneous transition labeled PA in figure 13
is now an instantan(ous transition out of the FEHM. (See fig. 23.) We have also added the
near-coincident fault rates.
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Figure 23. Permanent CARE III FEHM with N, C, and S exits.
Now the FEHM probabilities, when replaced by a branch point are
c3 - 6+p+2A + 6+p+2A e+2A c2-- 6+p+A + (_+p+A
and
s3= 6+p+2& eT2A 6+p+A e+A
As before, these probabilities are determined by the HARP program based on the user inputs
for the rates and probabilities in the model.
9.2. Near-Coincident Fault Options
As discussed in volume 1 of this Technical Paper, the HARP user has three options (three
multifault models) for modeling near-coincident faults. To better demonstrate the various
options allowed in HARP, the following Markov model is utilized. In this example, we show
that the reduced model after each FEHM has been reduced to a branch point. The ares entering
tile FNCF (not shown) are part of the inherent structure of the model. For each C*, there is a
corresponding N* into the FNCF state.
9.2.1. ALL-Inclusive Near-Coincident Multifault Model
This specification for the interfering fault assumes that a second near-coincident fault
anywhere in the system (while attempting to handle a first fault) causes immediate system failure
(via the FNCF state). The use of this model always gives a conservative result for practical
systems of interest. Volume 1 chapter 7 of this Technical Paper presents an example system
where the ALL model is specified for a system that has nearly independent fault containment
regions. Under certain conditions, the degree of conservative error can be quantified by using
HARP's simple lower bound (see vol. 1 of this TP). Another alternative is to modify the HARP
generated ASCII files (*.ALL, *.SAM, *.USR and perhaps the *.MAT in some cases) with a text
editor for specifying the exact next fault rate(s). When fault rates are specified correctly, an
accurate result can be obtained. The simple bounds also become valid for all Markovian models
and can be used to gauge the results. Using XHARP (ref. 15) is another alternative.
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Giventhe Markovchainof figure24, for tile arc lat)eledwith a "CI', tile next fault rate
is 5Al + 3A2+ 2Aa. This rate is found|)y lookingat the targetstate (state2) and taking tile
maximumof thesumof the incomingaresminus1.0for this componentype (A1)andthe sum
of the samecomponentype parametersexiting the state, lit addition, the maxinmnt between
the incoming and outgoing ares for ew,ry other component type in the dictionary is added to
lhe rate. (t{owever, the dictionary must be comph.'te for a correct rale.) For this system, the all
inclusive rate file appears as follows. (Note, the expression following each Ci is the next fault
rate correspon(ling to the (7i transition and is not, the coverage wdue.)
:lXl * ('2
N /
\ 2A,_ * (:4 t
Iqgure 21. Syslem modvl for examph' 1.
FIGURE 24 .ALL file
CI
5*LAMBDAI+3*LAMBDA2+2*LAMBDA3;
C2
5*LAMBDAI+3*LAMBDA2+2*LAMBDA3;
C3
5*LAMBDAI+2*LAMBDA2+2*LAMBDA3;
C4
5*LAMBDAI+3*LAMBDA2+LAMBDA3;
C5
4*LAMBDAI;
C6
3*LAMBDA1;
C7
2*LAMBDAI;
9.2.2. SAME-Type Near-Coincident Multifault Model
More optimistically, the user can assume that only near-coincident fimlts of the same
component type cause system failure (while attempting to handle a first fault). For the FEHM
associated with C1 in figure 24, only those eomt)onents that _il with rate A1 cause system
failure. The same tyt)e files appears as fi)llows:
FIGURE 24 .SAM file
CI
5*LAMBDAI;
C2
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5*LAMBDAI;
C3
2*LAMBDA2,
C4
LAMBDA3 ;
C5
4*LAMBDAI ;
C6
3*LAMBDAI ;
C7
2*LAMBDA 1 ;
9.2.3. USER-Defined Near-Coincident Multifault Model
For some models, the user can define explicitly for each component, which components (itself
and/or others) can interfere with fault recovery. Thus, the next fault rate for the FEHM's
between operational states depends on user input. Let us refer to those components with
rate A1 as processor1, A2 as processor2, and A3 as processor3. For this example, the user can
specify that all three processors interfere with recovery in the processor1 components, but only
processor2 affects recovery in processor2 and only processor3 interferes with its own recovery.
While processor1 can be modeled with the all-inclusive fault type and processor2 and processor3
with the same-type next fault rate, only one near-coincident fault, rate type can be specified for
the entire model. This file appears as follows:
FIGURE 24 .US}% file
Cl
5*LAMBDA 1+3*LAMBDA2+2*LAMBDA3 ;
C2
5*LAMBDA 1+3*LAMBDA2+2*LAMBDA3 ;
C3
2*LAMBDA2 ;
C4
LAMBDA3 ;
C5
4*LAMBDA I;
C6
3*LAMBDAI ;
C7
2*LAMBDAI ;
6O
9.2.4. Example for .ALL and .SAM Options
Now let A2 = A1, allowing tile user the ability to utilize an overriding FEHM file option. We
now remove the A3 arc for simplicity. (See fig. 25.)
3X_ *C2
3A1 *C3
Figure 25. System model fl)r exanq)h' 2.
For this system, the all inclusive rates are the same as the same type rates.
C1
6*LAMBDA1 ;
C2
5*LAMBDA1 ;
C3
5*LAMBDA1 ;
C4
4*LAldBDA1 ;
C5
3*LAIdBDA 1 ;
C6
2*LAMBDAi ;
9.2.5. No Near-Coincident Faults
If the user chooses, near-coincident faults can be ignored. As a result, the probability of
being in state FNCF is zero.
9.3. Specification of Near-Coincident Fault Rates
The user need not worry about the actual near-coincident fault rates in HARP. While running
the engine program (harpeng), the user is asked which near-coincident fault rate to use. Once one
of the four options is chosen (ALL-inclusive, SAME-type, USER-defined, NONE), the program
automatically determines the correct next fault rate. When no coverage models were specified
in the tdr_ive program or no near-coincident faults were specified in the fl'facc program, the user
is not asked about near-coincident faults in harl)eng.
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Chapter 10
Error Bounds
This section addresses the question posed by the engine pertaining to running bounds. In
general, the tdrive and fiface programs process a system model using failure rates that are
symbolic rather than numeric (of course, numeric values can be entered in the Markov chain in
tdrive if desired). The user binds the numeric values to the symbolic rates during the execution
of harpeng. Because many input parameters to the FORM model are not known exactly (i.e.,
coverage values from simulation are given as confidence intervals and the user may only know a
range of values for the failure rates), HARP enables the user to specify the rates as a nominal
value plus or minus a variation.
Two different kinds of bounds are provided by the HARP program, simple model (parametric)
bounds and model truncation bounds. Depending on the system being modeled, none, one, or
both kinds of bounds may be applicable.
The simple parametric bounds are computed for two distinct classes of models: The AS IS
model that does not use any FEHM's and does not invoke behavioral decomposition, and those
models that do invoke FEHM's and behavioral decomposition. Both model classes can also be
modified to reflect the model state reduction technique called truncation. (See vol. 1 of this TP.)
The AS IS model is used strictly for parametric analysis that reports the effect of system
unreliability as a function of the user-specified parametric variation. These data are useful for
sensitivity analyses. The simple parametric bounds for this model class are true bounds for the
original user-specified model. (See vol. 1 of this TP.)
When FEHM's and behavioral decomposition are invoked, the simple bounds take on two
manifestations. When no parametric variation is specified and the user selects the simple bounds
computation (prompted by HARP), simple upper and lower bounds are computed based on
estimated maximum and minimum imperfect coverage and lack of sufficient redundancy. If in
addition, parametric variation is specified, a combined effect is estimated, that is, imperfect
coverage with insufficient redundancy and parametric variation. Unlike the AS IS model, the
simple lower bound associated with behavioral decomposition is a conditional bound. When
many fault contaill_nent regions are modeled, the lower bound may not bound the full model
unreliability but will bound the HARP instantaneous jump model unreliability. (See vol. 1 of
this TP.)
HARP does not allow bounds to be evaluated when any failure rate is Weibull. When the
system being modeled has repair, bounds are evaluated only when an absorbing state is present
in the model.
10.1. Simple Model (Parametric) Bounds
10.1.1. AS IS Model
Because many input parameters to the FORM model are not known exactly (e.g., the user
may only know a range of values for the failure rates), HARP allows the FORM input parameters
to be expressed in terms of ranges of values rather than point estimates. HARP produces upper
and lower bounds on the system unreliability that are a function of these ranges of values. The
model evaluates the overall system failure probability by taking the lower bound on the failure
rates and the upper bound on the repair rates as the best case and by taking the upper bound
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on the failureratesandthe lowerboundon the repairratesasthe worstcase.The modelalso
producesthepredictedunreliabilitybasedon thenominalvalues.Thesimpleparametricbounds
for this modelclassareboundsfor theoriginaluser-specifiedmodel.
10.1.2. Models With Behavioral Decomposition
Weapproachtheanalysisoferrorsbydecomposingtheoriginalmodelinto twosimplermodels
that canbecombinedto obtainaconservativeunreliabilityestimate(refs.19to 21). Thegeneral
formof the simpleboundsis givenas:
P(AUB ) <_ min[1,P(Ahigh)+ P(Bmax)]
P(AUB ) _ ma, x[P(Alow),P(Bmin)]
The first rule gives the conservative bound, and the second rule gives the optimistic bound m.
The first expression gives the upper unreliability bound, and the second gives the lower
unreliability bound. P(A) is the system failure probability caused by the lack of sufficient
redundancy. P(Ahigh) and P(Alow) are used instead of P(A) when parametric tolerance is
selected to cause P(A) to be maximum to get P(Ahigh) and to cause P(A) to be minimum to
get P(Alow)- P(B) is the probability of system failure due to imperfect coverage. When FEHM's
are specified for behavioral decomposition, P(B) is computed for the minimum imperfect
coverage to get P(Bmin) and the maximum imperfect coverage to get P(Bmax). P(A) is further
modified when transients are specified in at least one FEHM. The perfect redundancy model
(coverage assumed to be perfect) transition rates are modified by coefficients that reflect transient
restoration probabilities. The net effect is to reduce the probability of failure by redundancy
exhaustion since transient restoration occurs.
The simple bounds computed by HARP are the bounds on the instantaneous coverage model
(see vol. 1 of this TP) that produces the unreliability result and also bomlds the user's full
model under certain conditions: The simple upper bound on the system unreliability is always a
true bound with respect to both the instantaneous coverage model and the user-specified model
(provided all failure rates are constant).lt
The validity of the optimistic lower bound with respect to the user-specified model is
dependent on the use of large mmlbers of fault containment regions that require the ALL
multifault model (see chapters 1 and 7 of this TP for details).
The HARP simple bounds are used for preliminary estimates of unreliat)ility. They are
provided as a quick-look computation that can be used in the early stages of system design
when only ranges of parameter values are available. The essence of HARP output is the nominal
result (instantaneous jump model unreliability) and not the simple bounds. If the model is solved
AS IS, without any FEHM's or with the VALUES FEHM, the HARP bounds are true bounds
for the user-specified flfll model. With FEHM's, the upper bound is always a true bound, and
the lower bound is also a true bound except possibly for a limited class of systems with many
fault containment regions.
10 Validity of these })ounds is subject to lh_ corr(_('t specification of multi fault models, where applicable (see vol. 1 of this
TP).
II HARP FEtINI's and multifault models only support single recov(!ry transitions. SysteIll models with multiple recovery
transitions can cause the simple upper bound to improperly bound the HARP unreliability result or the full model. For
such systems, the user can edit HAtlP-generated ASCII files with a text editor to speci[y the correct model. In this cause,
the bounds will be valid. XHARP provi(tes another modeling alternative. The HARP AS IS model can also 1)e used t(_
provide accurate results.
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10.2. Truncation Bounds
Truncation bounds are obtained as follows. When the truncated model is solved, the
probability of being in each of the TA states is calculated. By adding these probabilities to
that of the DOWN (failed) states (DS) before the truncation line, we get an upper bound on
the system unreliability (SU). This result assumes that all states beyond the truncation line are
failed states. To get a lower bound on unreliability, we add only the probabilities of the failure
states before the truncation line. In this case, the TA states are automatically considered to be
functional states by HARP. To use some notation, the states in the truncated model are denoted
with a subscript tr and the states in the full model have the subscript full. The bounds on the
system unreliability are given by the following equation:
Pr(DStr) < SUful I _< Pr(TAtr)+ Pr(DStr)
HARP not only gives the system unreliability but also provides a breakdown in terms of
individual failure probabilities. Failure causes are the exhaustion of different components, FNCF
and FSPF. In a truncated model, HARP gives bounds on the system unreliability as well as
individual failure probabilities. F1 denotes a state where fewer than the minimum required of
component type 1 are still operational. If there is an F1 state before the truncation level, we
use the probability of being in the F1 state as a lower bound on the probability of failure due
to exhaustion of component i. All transitions due to failure of component 1 that fall on the
truncation line and do not lead to state F1 are directed into a state called TA1.
Probability of failure due to exhaustion of component 1, Pr(Flfull ), is bounded as follows:
Pr(Fltr) <_ Pr(Flfull) <_ Pr(TAltr)+ Pr(Fltr)
The bounds on the probability of exhaustion of other components are obtained in a similar
manner. Now we obtain bounds for the probability of a near-coincident fault and a single-point
fault.
The probability of being in the FNCF state before the truncation level is a lower bound on
the FNCF probability. The upper bound is taken to be this lower bound probability added to
the combined probability of all TA states:
Pr(FNCFtr) < Pr(FNCFfull ) < Pr(TAtr)+ Pr(FNCFtr)
The bounds on probability of single-point fault are obtained in a similar manner as given as
follows:
Pr(FSPFtr) < Pr(FSPFfull ) < Pr(rAtr)4-Pr(FSPFtr)
10.3. Combined Bounds
When parametric bounds (via a simple model) are desired from a truncated model, the bounds
are combined in the following way. The simple model solution uses the optimistic parameters
(lowest possible failure rates, highest possible repair rates and coverage factors) to produce an
upper bound on tile reliability of the system (ref. 20).
Rhigh(t) = 1 -- max[Peshlow(t), Pcovlow(t)]
If the model from which the simple bounds are derived is a truncated model, then the
TA states are taken to be operational states (for the optimistic bound). Likewise, the simple
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modelsolutionusestile pessimisticparameters(highestpossiblefifilure rates,lowestpossible
coveragefactorsandrepair rates)to producea lower/)omMon the unreliabilityof th¢'sysWnl
(ref.20).
Hlow(t) = 1 -min[Poshhigh(t)+ [],ovhigh(t), 1]
If t.he model from which the simple model bounds are derived is a truncated model, then the
TA states are taken to be failure states (for the pessimistic bom_ds). The first type of bounds are
reported as "simple model bounds," the second type are reported a.s "t.rmlcaled model bomMs.'"
and the combined bomlds arc reported as "truncated simple nlodel bounds."
The use of behavioral det:omposition and instantaneous coverage factors have been proven to
result ill conservative estimates of reliability (ref. 22), when failure rates are constant. (ext)onential
times t.o failure). Both bounding techniques (simple and truncation) produce bounds on this
conservative estimate of reliability. For the class of practical highly reliable systems, the HARP
(simple and truncation) bomlds also encompass the reliability of tile original model.
If a model is extremely large and cannot fit in the engine data structure simultaneously, the
bounds are disallowed. Also, if a model has Weibull failure rates or no absorbing states, bounds
are not asked for nor provided.
NASA Langley Research Centt_r
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
June 15, 199,I
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Appendix A
File Listings of HARP Examples
A1. Example 3PFT1
Exampl(_ 3PFT1 presents a model of a three pro(:c'ssor (tripl(_x) system that was input as a
fault tree. Each component is specified as a unique b_tsic event. (See section 3.1.)
File 3PFTI.DIC gives the output fronl [)rogram td_vc.
I PROCESSORI LAMBDAI NONE
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPES:
2 PROCESSOR2 LAMBDA2 NONE
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPES:
3 PROCESSOR3 LAMBDA3 NONE
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPES:
FEIDS
i0 9 8
File 3PFTI.INT gives the output from program tdrivc.
SORTED
I 2 LAMBDAI;
i 3 LAMBDA2;
I 4 LAMBDA3;
2 5 LAMBDA2;
2 6 LAMBDA3;
3 5 LAMBDAI;
3 7 LAMBDA3;
4 6 LAMBDAI;
4 7 LAMBDA2;
5 8 LAMBDA3*X;
6 9 LAMBDA2*X;
7 10 LAMBDAI*X;
File 3PFT1.MAT gives the output ffomprogramfiface.
$0
2 , 1
LAMBDA1;
3 , 1
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LAMBDA2;
4 , I
LAMBDA3;
5 , 2
LAMBDA2;
5 , 3
LAMBDAI;
6 , 2
LAMBDA3;
6 , 4
LAMBDAI;
7 , 3
LAMBDA3;
7 , 4
LAMBDA2;
8 , 5
LAMBDA3*X;
9 , 6
LAMBDA2*X;
i0 , 7
LAMBDAI*X;
0,0
File 3PFT1.SYM gives the output from prograln fifece.
X
999
END SYMBOL DEFINITION
F1
I010
F2
1009
F3
1008
END FAILURE STATE DEFINITION
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File 3PFTI.RS1 gives the output from program harpeng.
HARP
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
Release Version 7.0
February 1993
Modelname:
3PFT1
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: 1 Name: PROCESSOR1
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDAI Constant failure rate:
0.10000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: NONE
Component type: 2 Name: PROCESSOR2
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA2 Constant failure rate:
O.IO000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: NONE
Component type: 3 Name: PROCESSOR3
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA3 Constant failure rate:
0.10000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: NONE
NO near-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
0.32837475D-06
0.32837475D-06
0.32837475D-06
State Probabilities
State name: F1
State name: F2
State name: F3
O.O0000000D+O0
O.O0000000D+O0
O.O0000000D+O0
Reliability = 0.99999901D+00
Unreliability = 0.98512425D-06
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.98512425D-06
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.I07D-16
relative error value O.IOOD-08
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See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GEKK ODE solver.
A2. Example 3PFT2
Example 3PFT2 is identical to the previous one except that a replication factor of three is
specified for the basic events to aggregate the unique basic events into one basic event. (See
section a.2.)
File 3PFT2.DIC gives the output from program tdrive.
I PROCESSOR LAMBDA NONE
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPES:
FEIDS
4
File 3PFT2.INT gives the output from program _d_'ive.
SORTED
1
2
3
2 3,LAMBDA;
3 2*LAMBDA;
4 LAMBDA*X;
File 3PFT2.MAT gives the output [rom program fifacc.
4
2 , 1
3*LAMBDA;
3 , 2
2*LAMBDA;
4 , 3
LAMBDA*X;
0,0
File 3PFT2.SYM gives the output from program fiface.
X
999
END SYMBOL DEFINITION
F1
1004
END FAILURE STATE DEFINITION
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File 3PFT2.RS1 gives the output from program harpeng.
HARP
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
Release Version 7.0
February 1993
0.98512425D-06
Modelname:
3PFT2
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: I Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
0.10000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: NONE
NO near-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name: FI
O.O0000000D+O0
Reliability = 0.99999901D+00
Unreliability = 0.98512425D-06
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.98512425D-06
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.716D-17
relative error value 0.I00D-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GEKK ODE solver.
A3. Example 3PMC
Example 3PMC is the same system model as previously displayed, but it is entered ms a
Markov chain directly in lieu of a fault tree. (See section 3.3.)
File 3PMC.DIC gives tile output from program tdrive.
-1ASIS
File 3PMC.INT gives the output _omprogramtdrivc.
UNSORTED
3 2 3*LAMBDA;
2 1 2*LAMBDA;
1 FI LAMBDA;
7O
File 3PMC.MAT gives the output _om program fiface.
4
2 , 1
3*LAMBDA;
3 , 2
2*LAMBDA;
4 , 3
LAMBDA*X;
0,0
File 3PMC.SYMgives the output _omprogramfiface.
X
999
END SYMBOL DEFINITION
Fi
1004
END FAILURE STATE DEFINITION
File 3PMC.RSI gives the output _om program harpeng.
HARP
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
Release Version 7.0
February 1993
+/- O.O0000000D+O0
0.98512425D-06
Modelname:
3PMC
Symbolic values:
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
O.IO000000D-02
NO near-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name: F1
Reliability = 0.99999901D+00
Unreliability = 0.98512425D-06
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.98512425D-06
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GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.716D-17
relative error value 0.100D-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
A4. Example 3PCARE1
These files are for the replicated triplex processor system with a CARE FEHM specified for
permanent faults. (See section 6.)
FILE 3PCARE1.DIC output from program tdrive.
1 PROCESSOR LAMBDA CAKEI.FHM
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPES:
FEIDS
4
File 3PCAREI.INT gives the output from program tdrive.
SORTED
1 2
2 3
3 4
3*LAMBDA;
2*LAMBDA;
LAMBDA*X;
FEHM FILE CARE1.FHM
CAKE.SINGLE.FAULT.MODEL
PROBABILITY OF PERMANENT: O.lO000000d+Ol
PROBABILITY OF INTERMITTENT: O.O0000000d+O0
PROBABILITY OF TRANSIENT: O.O0000000d+O0
PERMANENT MODEL PARAMETERS
DELTA: 0.36000000d+03
EPSILON: 0.36000000d+04
RHO: 0.18000000d+03
PA: O.lO000000d+Ol
Q: 0.99900000d+00
File 3PCARE1.MAT gives the output _om program fiface.
5
2 , 1
3*LAMBDA*C1;
3 , 2
2*LAMBDA*CI;
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4 , 3
LAMBDA*X;
5 , 1
3*LAMBDA*S1;
5 , 2
2*LAMBDA*S1;
0,0
File3PCARE1.SYM gives the outputfromprogram fiface.
Cl
3
CARE1.FHM
X
999
END SYMBOL DEFINITION
F1
1004
FSPF
1005
END FAILURE STATE DEFINITION
File 3PCARE1.RS1 gives theoutputfronlprogran_ h arpeng.
................. HARP
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
............ Release Version 7.0 .............
February 1993
Modelname:
3PCARE1
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: 1 Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
O.IO000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: CAREI.FHM
For this FEHM model, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absence of near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration: O.O0000000D+O0
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O.O0000000D+O0
Permanentcoverage:
Single-point failure:
NOnear-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name:F1
State name:FSPF
0.99966667D+00
0.33333333D-03
0.98446761D-06
0.99498051D-05
Reliability = 0.99998907D+00
Unreliability = 0.I0934273D-04
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.98446761D-06
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.I07D-16
relative error value O.IOOD-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
A5. Example 3PARIES
These files are for the replicated triplex processor system with an ARIES FEHM specified.
(See section 6.2).
FEHM file ARIES.FHM
ARIES.TRANSIENT.RECOVERY.MODEL
PROBABILITY THAT FAULT IS TRANSIENT 0.90000000d+00
MEAN DURATION 0F TRANSIENT FAULT 0.50000000d-02
PROHABII,ITY THAT FAULT IS CATASTROPHIC 0.10000000d-02
NUMBER OF TRANSIENT RECOVERY PHASES 3
PHASE 1 DURATION:
PHASE 2 DURATION:
PHASE 3 DURATION:
0.80000000d+O0 EFFECTIVENESS:
0.20000000d+O0 EFFECTIVENESS:
O.lO000000d+O0 EFFECTIVENESS:
0.80000000d+O0
0.70000000d+O0
0.50000000d+O0
FAILURE RATE OF RECOVERY SYSTEM HARDWARE: .O0000000D+O0
COVERAGE OF PERMANENT FAULT: 0.85000000d+00
File 3PARIES.RS1 gives the output _omprogramharpeng.
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Modelname:
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3PARIESI
Input description (from dictionary file):
Componenttype: 1 N_me:PROCESSOR
Symbolicfailure rate:
LAMBDA Constantfailure rate:
O.IO000000D-02 +/-
FEHMfile name:ARIES.FHM
For this FEHMmodel, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absenceof near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration:
Permanentcoverage:
Single-point failure:
NOnear-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name:F1 0.99891519D+00
State name:FSPF 0.I0848086D-02
0.76423498D+00
O.O0000000D+O0
0.199559027D+00
0.36214753D-01
Reliability = 0.99891519D+00
Unreliability = 0.I0848086D-02
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.39604048D-07
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.280D-19 {Depend on computing}
relative error value O.IOOD-08 {platform}
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
A6. Example 3PCARE2
These files are for tile triplex processor system using tile CARE FEHM with transient _ults.
(See section 6.4.)
FEHM FILE CARE2.FHM
CARE.SINGLE.FAULT.NODEL
PROBABILITY OF PERMANENT: O.O0000000d+O0
PROBABILITY 0F INTERMITTENT: 0.00000000d+00
PROBABILITY OF TRANSIENT: 0.10000000d+01
TRANSIENT MODEL PARAMETERS
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ALPHA: 0.36000000d+05
DELTA: 0.36000000d+03
EPSILON: 0.36000000d+04
RH0: 0.18000000d÷03
PA: 0.50000000d+O0
PB: 0.50000000d+O0
Q: 0.90000000d+00
File 3PCARE2.RS1 gives the output from program harpeng.
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0.99232518D+00
0.71796719D-02
0.49514978D-03
Modelname:
3PCARE2
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: I Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
O.IO000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: CARE2.FHM
For this FEHM model, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absence of near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration:
Permanent coverage:
Single-point failure:
NO near-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name: F1 0.51414141D-I0
State name: FSPF 0.14853850D-04
O.O0000000D+O0
Reliability = 0.99998515D+00
Unreliability = 0.14853901D-04
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.51414141D-I0
GEKK DDE solver: global error value 0.358D-17
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relative error value O.IOOD-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
AT. Example 3PCARE3
These files are for the triplex processor using the CARE FEHhl with intermittent _ults. (See
section 7.)
FEHM file CARE3.FHM
CARE.SINGLE.FAULT.MODEL
PROBABILITY OF PERMANENT: 0.20000000d+O0
PROBABILITY OF INTERMITTENT: 0.20000000d+O0
PROBABILITY OF TRANSIENT: 0.60000000d+O0
PERMANENT MODEL PARAMETERS
DELTA: 0.30000000d+03
EPSILON: 0.36000000d+04
RHO: 0.24000000d+03
PA: O.iO000000d+Oi
Q: 0.99900000d+00
INTERMITTENT MODEL PARAMETERS
ALPHA: 0.21000000d+04
BETA: 0.30000000d+04
DELTA: 0.36000000d+03
EPSILON: 0.36000000d+04
RHO: 0.18000000d+03
PA: 0.90000000d+O0
PB: O.iO000000d+O0
Q: 0.99900000d+00
TRANSIENT MODEL PARAMETERS
ALPHA: 0.36000000d+05
DELTA: 0.18000000d+03
EPSILON: 0.36000000d+04
RHO: 0.18000000d+03
PA: 0.50000000d+O0
PB: 0.50000000d+O0
Q: 0.99900000d+00
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File 3PCARE3.RS1 gives thc output from program harpeng.
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Modelname:
3PCARE3
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: I Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
0.I0000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: CARE3.FHM
For this FEHM model, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absence of near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration:
Permanent coverage:
Single-point failure:
NO near-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name: F1 0.16103642D-06
State name: FSPF 0.51387370D-05
O.O0000000D+O0
Reliability = 0.99999470D+00
Unreliability = 0.52997734D-05
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.16103642D-06
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.358D-17
relative error value 0.I00D-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
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A8. Example 3MMOMENTS
These files are for the triplex processor system with the Moments FEHM. The Moments
FEHM is substituted for the ARIES FEHM. (See section 6.2.)
FEHM file FEHM.MOM
PROBABILITIES.AND.MOMENTS
TRANSIENT RESTORATION EXIT:
EXIT PROBABILITY: .9800
FIRST MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: O.
SECOND MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: O.
THIRD MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: O.
RECONFIGURATION COVERAGE EXIT:
EXIT PROBABILITY: .1615e-0i
FIRST MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: 45.00
SECOND MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: .2500
THIRD MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: O.
SINGLE POINT FAILURE EXIT:
EXIT PROBABILITY: .3850e-02
FIRST MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: O.
SECOND MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: O.
THIRD MOMENT OF TIME TO EXIT: O.
File 3MMOM.RS1 gives the output from program harpe_9.
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Modelname:
3MMOM
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: i Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
O.IO000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: MOM.FHM
For this FEHM model, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absence of near-coincident faults)
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O.O0000000D+O0
Transient restoration:
Permanentcoverage:
Single-point failure:
NOnear-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): 0.I00D+02
State Probabilities
State name:FI
State name:FSPF
0.98000000D+00
0.16150000D-01
0.38500000D-Off
0.26010668D-09
0.11548400D-03
Reliability = O. 99988452D+00
Unreliability = O. I1548426D-03
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.26010668D-09
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.175D-20
relative error value O. 100D-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GEKK ODE solver.
A9. Example 3MDIST
These files are for the triplex processor system with the Distributions and Probabilities
FEHM. The Distributions and Probabilities FEHM is substituted for tile ARIES FEHM. (See
section 6.2.)
FEHM file DIS.FHM
DISTRIBUTIONS. AND. PROBABILITIES
TRANSIENT RESTORATION EXIT:
EXIT PROBABILITY : O. O0000000d+O0
RECONFIGURATION COVERAGE EXIT:
EXIT PROBABILITY : 0. 99000000d+00
DISTRIBUTION TYPE: EXP
RATE : O. 16670000d-01
SINGLE POINT FAILURE EXIT:
EXIT PROBABILITY: O. lO000000d-Ol
DISTRIBUTION TYPE: CONSTANT
VALUE: O.O0000000d+O0
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File 3NIDIST.RS1 gives the output from prograin haTpeT_g.
................. HARP .......................
- The Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor -
............ Release Version 7.0 .............
............... February 1893 ................
O.O0000000D+O0
0.99000000D+00
O.IO000000D-OI
Modelname:
3PDIS
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: 1 Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
O.IO000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: DIS.FHM
For this FEHM model, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absence of near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration:
Permanent coverage:
Single-point failure:
NO near-coincident faults considered.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name: F1 0.96552028D-06
State name: FSPF 0.29846563D-03
O.O0000000D+O0
Reliability = 0.99970057D+00
Unreliability = 0.29943115D-03
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.96552028D-06
GERJ< ODE solver: global error value 0.358D-IT
relative error value O.IOOD-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
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A10. Example 3P2B
These files are for a triplex processor and dual bus system witii the ESPN FEHM for
tile processors and the VALUES FEHM for the bus. The state probabilities differ from your
execution of this example. (See section 8.)
File 3P2B.DIC gives the output Dom program tdrive.
i PROCESSOR LAMBDA ESPN.FHM
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPES: 2
2 BUS MU VALUES
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPES:
FEIDS
7 6
File 3P2B.INT gives tile output _om program tdrive.
SORTED
I 2 3*LAMBDA;
1 3 2*flU;
2 4 2*LAMBDA;
2 5 2*NU;
3 5 3*LAMBDA;
3 6 MU*X;
4 7 LAMBDA*X;
4 8 2*NI;
5 8 2*LAMBDA;
5 6 MU*X;
8 7 LAMBDA*X;
8 6 NU*X;
FEHMFile ESPN.FHM
HARP.SINGLE.FAULT.MODEL
COVEKAGE INPUT PARAMETERS:
TIME DISTRIBUTION AND PARAMETERS
ACTIVE TRANSITION
BENIGN TRANSITION
TRANSIENT LIFETIME
DETECT TRANSITION
ERROR TRANSITION
ERROR-DETECT TRANSITION
UNIF O. 1.000
UNIF O. .5000
EXP i00.0 O.
UNIF O. .4000
WEBUL I0.00 2.500
WEBUL 50.00 .2500
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ISOLATIONTRANSITION
RECOVERYTRANSITION
RECONFIGURATIONRANSITION
OTHERPARAMETERS:
NORML
ERLNG
NORML
PROBABILITYOFFAULTDETECTIONBYSELFTEST:
PROBABILITYOFERRORDETECTION:0.9000
PROB.OFISOLATINGDETECTEDFAULT:0.9000
NUMBEROFRECOVERYATTEMPTS: 5
PROB.OFSUCCESSFULRECONFIGURATION:0.9000
FRACTIONOFFAULTSWHICHARETRANSIENT:
FRACTIONOFFAULTSWHICHAREPERMANENT:
DESIREDCONFIDENCELEVEL:90%
ALLOWABLEERROR:10%
File 3P2B.MAT gives the output from program fifac_.
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2 1
3*LAMBDA*C1;
3 1
2*MU*C2;
4 2
2*LAMBDA*C3;
5 2
2*MU*C2;
5 3
3*LAMBDA*C4;
6 3
MU*X;
6 5
MU*X;
6 8
MU*X;
7 4
LAMBDA*X;
7 , 8
LAMBDA*X;
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4.000
100.0
1.000
0.9000
0.5000
0.4000
1.000
2.000
.5000
8 , 4
2*MU*C2 ;
8 , 5
2*LAMBDA*C5;
9 , 1
3*LAMBDA*SI+2*MU*S2;
9 , 2
2.LAMBDA*S3+2*MU*S2;
9 , 3
3*LAMBDA*S4;
9 , 4
2*MU*S2 ;
9 , 5
2*LAMBDA*S5;
10 , 1
3*LAMBDA*NI+2*MU*N2;
I0 , 2
2*LAMBDA*N3+2*MU*N2;
10 , 3
3*LAMBDA*N4;
10 , 4
2*MU*N2;
10 , 5
2*LAMBDA*N5;
0,0
File 3P2B.SYMgives theoutput from program flface.
C1
3
ESPN.FHM
C2
7
0.500000 0.000000
R2
8
0.300000 0.000000
84
N2
9
0.000000 0.000000
$2
i0
0.200000 0.000000
C3
3
ESPN.FHM
C4
3
ESPN.FHM
C5
3
ESPN.FHM
X
999
ENDSYMBOLDEFINITION
F1
1007
F2
1006
FSPF
1009
FNCF
1010
END FAILURE STATE DEFINITION
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Files 3P2B.RS*give the output from program harpeng resulting from successive harpeng
executions. Each 3P2B.RS* file is the output from a subsequent execution of harpeng with
different multifault model specifications.
3P2B. RS 1
This listing is for 3P2B.RS1 for the same system previously presented with no near-coincident
fault model invoked.
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Modelname:
3P2B
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: I Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
0.50000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: ESPN.FHM
For this FEHM model, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absence of near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration: 0.50000000D+O0
Permanent coverage: 0.36375000D-01
Single-point failure: 0.46362500D+00
O.O0000000D+O0
Component type: 2 Name: BUS
Symbolic failure rate:
MU Constant failure rate:
0.50000000D-Of
FEHM file name: VALUES
Symbolic values:
C2
R2
*These values could*
*change with each *
* subsequent run. *
* (see section i0) *
+/- O.O0000000D+O0
Coverage factor, value directly specified:
0.50000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
Restoration factor, value directly specified:
0.30000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
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N2
$2
NCFfactor, value directly specified:
O.O0000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
SPFfactor, value directly specified:
0.20000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
NOnear-coincident faults considered.
GERKreport E201,Tolerancesreset:
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
0.13159858D-06
0.81088630D-01
0.19924322D+00
O.O0000000D+O0
State Probabilities
State name: F1
State name: F2
State name: FSPF
State name: FNCF
O.IOOD-08 O.IOOD-08
*These values could change*
*(see section I0) *
Reliability = 0.71966802D+00
Unreliability = 0.28033198D+00
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.81088762D-01
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.734D-11
relative error value O.IOOD-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
i Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
3P2B.RS2
This listing is for the 3P2B.RS2 file for the same previously described system with the
ALL-INCLUSIVE multifault model invoked. The state probabilities, reliability, and unreliability
values will change in each subsequent run. (See chaptcr 10.)
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Modelname:
3P2B
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: i Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
87
0.50000000D-02 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
FEHMfile name:ESPN.FHM
For this FEHMmodel, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absenceof near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration: 0.50000000D+O0
Permanentcoverage: 0.36375000D-01
Single-point failure: 0.46362500D+00
Component type: 2 Name: BUS
Symbolic failure rate:
MU Constant failure rate:
0.50000000D-01 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
FEHM file name: VALUES
Symbolic values:
C2 Coverage factor, value directly specified:
0.50000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
R2 Restoration factor, value directly specified:
0.30000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
N2 NCF factor, value directly specified:
O.O0000000D+O0 +/- OoO0000000D+O0
S2 SPF factor, value directly specified:
0.20000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
ALL-INCLUSIVE near-coincident fault rate used.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name: F1
State name: F2
State name: FSPF
State name: FNCF
0.13157227D-06
0.81088606D-01
0.19923770D+00
0.59530150D-05
*These could change*
*(see section 10) *
*These values could change*
*(see section 10) *
Reliability = 0.71966761D+00
Unreliability = 0.28033239D+00
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.81088738D-01
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.348D-13
relative error value O.IOOD-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
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0 Reports from the GERKODEsolver.
3P2B.RS3
This listing is for the 3P2B.RS3file for the previoussystemwith SAME-typemultifault
mode]invoked.
HARP
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0.50000000D+00
0.36375000D-01
0.46362500D+00
O.O0000000D+O0
C2 Coverage factor, value directly specified:
0.50000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
R2 Restoration factor, value directly specified:
0.30000000D+00 +/- 0.00000000D+00
N2 NCF factor, value directly specified:
0.00000000D+00 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
S2 SPF factor, value directly specified:
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Modelname:
3P2B
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: 1 Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
0.50000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: ESPN.FHM
For this FEHM model, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absence of near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration:
Permanent coverage:
Single-point failure:
Component type: 2 Name: BUS
Symbolic failure rate:
MU Constant failure rate:
0.50000000D-01 +/-
FEHM file name: VALUES
Symbolic values:
O.O0000000D+O0
0.20000000D+O0 +/-
SAME-TYPEnear-coincident fault rate used.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name:F1
State name:F2
State name:FSPF
State name:FNCF
0.13159661D-06
0.81088627D-01
0.19924267D+00
0.59152289D-06
O.O0000000D+O0
Reliability = 0.71966798D+00
Unreliability = 0.28033202D+00
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.81088759D-01
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.348D-13
relative error value O.IOOD-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
3P2B.RS4
This listing is _r the 3P2B.RS4 file _r the same previous system with the USER-defined
multifault model invoked.
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Modelname:
3P2B
Input description (from dictionary file):
Component type: 1 Name: PROCESSOR
Symbolic failure rate:
LAMBDA Constant failure rate:
0.50000000D-02 +/-
FEHM file name: ESPN.FHM
For this FEHM model, the exit probabilities are:
(in the absence of near-coincident faults)
Transient restoration:
O.O0000000D+O0
0.50000000D+O0
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Permanentcoverage:
Single-point failure:
INTERFERINGCOMPONENTTYPES:2
Componenttype: 2 Name: BUS
Symbolic failure rate:
MU Constant failure rate:
0.50000000D-Of
FEHM file name: VALUES
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPES:
Symbolic values:
0.36375000D-01
0.46362500D+O0
+/- O.O0000000D+O0
C2 Coverage factor, value directly specified:
0.50000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
R2 Restoration factor, value directly specified:
0.30000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
N2 NCF factor, value directly specified:
O.O0000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
$2 SPF factor, value directly specified:
0.20000000D+O0 +/- O.O0000000D+O0
INTERFERING COMPONENT TYPE near-coincident rate.
Time(in Hours): O.IOOD+02
State Probabilities
State name: F1
State name: F2
State name: FSPF
State name: FNCF
0.13157423D-06
0.81088609D-01
0.19923825D+00
0.53616071D-05
Reliability = 0.71966765D+00
Unreliability = 0.28033235D+00
Total failure by redundancy exhaustion = 0.81088740D-01
GERK ODE solver: global error value 0.348D-13
relative error value 0.100D-08
See Users Guide, section 3.3 for interpretation.
0 Reports from the GERK ODE solver.
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FEHMfile ESPN.FHMa_er running harpeng.
HARP.SINGLE.FAULT.MODEL
COVERAGE INPUT PARAMETERS:
TIME DISTRIBUTION AND PARAMETERS
ACTIVE TRANSITION
BENIGN TRANSITION
TRANSIENT LIFETIME
DETECT TRANSITION
ERROR TRANSITION
ERROR-DETECT TRANSITION
ISOLATION TRANSITION
RECOVERY TRANSITION
RECONFIGURATION TRANSITION
OTHER PARAMETERS:
UNIF O. 1.000
UNIF O. .5000
EXP I00.0 O.
UNIF O. .4000
WEBUL I0.00 2.500
WEBUL 50.00 .2500
NOKML 4.000 1.000
ERLNG I00.0 2.000
NORML 1.000 .5000
PROBABILITY OF FAULT DETECTION BY SELF TEST: 0.9000
PROBABILITY OF ERROR DETECTION: 0.9000
PROB. OF ISOLATING DETECTED FAULT: 0.9000
NUMBER OF RECOVERY ATTEMPTS: 5
PROB. OF SUCCESSFUL RECONFIGURATION: 0.9000
FRACTION OF FAULTS WHICH ARE TRANSIENT: 0.5000
FRACTION OF FAULTS WHICH ARE PERMANENT: 0.4000
DESIRED CONFIDENCE LEVEL: 90%
ALLOWABLE ERROR: 10%
** Cut here if parameters in FEHM have changed **
** to obtain new simulation results. Rerun harpeng. **
SIMULATION RESULTS:
R EXIT:
PROB[REACHING EXIT]:
IST MOMENT:
2ND MOMENT:
3KD MOMENT:
C EXIT:
PROB[REACHING EXIT]: LOW=O.32931688E-OI NOM=O.36375000E-OI HIGH=O.39818312E-OI
IST MOMENT: LOW= 3.2281735 NOM= 3.5878440 HIGH= 3.9475146
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LOW=0.4908041? NOM=0.50000000 HIGH=0.50919583
LOW=O.48844865E-02 NOM=O.51583926E-02 HIGH=O.5432298?E-02
LOW= O. NOM=O.13748132E-03 HIGH=O.15ZZ1914E-02
LOW=O.52741874E-05 NOM=O.52741874E-05 HIGH=O.52741874E-05
2NDMOMENT: LOW= O.
3RDMOMENT: LOW= O.
S EXIT:
PROB[REACHINGEXIT]: LOW=0.45098586
IST MOMENT: LOW=3.2217696
2ND MOMENT: LOW= O.
3RD MOMENT: LOW= O.
NOM= 26.736224
NOM= 202.06828
HIGH= 119.16996
HIGH= 1027.6762
NOM=0.46362500 HIGH=0.47626414
NQM= 3.2808923 HIGH= 3.3400150
NOM= 25.452089 HIGH= 186.29844
NOM= O. HIGH= O.
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Appendix B
Modeling Advanced Fault-Tolerant
Systems With HARP
Since the original draft of the tutorial wa.s written, the HARP developers have explored
the possible uses of the dynamic fault tree gates. Many of models involving the use of the
dependency fault tree gates were published ir_ sew_'ra] conference proceedings and journals. One
of these papers (ref. 23) is included in this at)pendix to illustrate the powerfill modeling flexibility
of tile dynamic fault tree gates (ref. 24) and to encourage the reader to further explore their
applications through I.t,,_, published literature (refs. 25 to 30). Part of the work emt)odied in this
paper is the work of the U.S. Government and thus may be used for government purposes; any
other use is not authorized.
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Modeling Advanced Fault Tolerant Systems with HARP
Summary
Reliabdity analysis of fault tolerant computer systems for critical applications is complicated by several
factors, In this tutorial, we discuss these modeling difficulties and describe and demonstrate dynamic fault
tree modelJ1_g !echniq,_,'s for handling them The techniques described include behavioral decomposition, a
Markov solution of a fault tree, and the use of special purpose gates in the fault tree to model sequence
dependent behavior. Several advanced fault tolerant computer systems are described, and fault tree models
for their analysis are presented. These systems include a loosely-coupled distributed system, a system of fault
tolerant building blocks, a fault tolerant parallel processor, a mission avionics system and several instances
of fault tolerant hypercube architectures. HARP (the Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor) is a software
package developed at Duke University and NASA Langley Research Center that is capable of solving the fault
tree models presented int this tutorial.
Knowledge of fault tree and Markov modeling is assumed. The emphasis of this tutorial is on techniques
for constructing a dynamic fault tree model of advanced systems. This fault tree will be solved using Markov
methods. We assume that the modeler will use some software package for solution of the model; a mathematxcal
discussion of so|ution techniques is not included.
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Part I
Background
1 Introduction
Fault tolerant computer systems for critical applications
are characterized by several factors which complicate
their analysis. Systems designed to achieve high levels
of reliability frequently employ high levels of redundancy,
dynamic redundancy management, and complex fault and
error recovery techniques. In this tutorial we consider
advanced fault tree modeling techniques to include these
factors in the analysis of system reliability.
In this tutorial, we assume the following
• Faults occur randomly and are statistically indepen-
dent.
• Lifetime distributions are exponential. Faults occur
at a constant average rate, which is referred to as the
failure rate of the component.
• Mission lengths are relatively short, so that the prob-
ability of more than a few failures is low.
• The systems are not repairable while in use.
Systems which violate these assumptions can be handled
by more sophisticated techniques which fall outside the
scope of this tutorial.
There are several possible for the reliability analysis of
fault tolerant computer systems for critical applications.
In addition to predicting the reliability of the system for
a specified mission time, these techniques can facilitate
tradeoff analysis for various fault tolerant techniques, or
can be used to compare alternative architectures for a
system still in the design phase. Even if a system exists
only as a rough sketch on paper, analysis techniques can
be used to analyze parametric sensitivity in order to de-
termine which factors have the strongest impact on the
reliability of the system.
Fault trees are frequently used for reliability analysis
of critical systems. Fault tree models are well accepted
and solution methods are well known, but exact analy-
sis of fault trees with many basic events is often expen-
sive, both in terms of developing the model and in solving
the model once it is developed. Also, several important
types of dynamic behavior in advanced fault tolerant sys-
tems cannot be adequately captured in a standard fault
tree model. These dynamic behaviors include transient
recovery, intermittent errors, and sequence dependency.
Markov models present an alternative modeling technique
that is flexible enough to model nearly any such dynamic
system. Tools and techniques exist for the solution of
even very large Markov models. However, the construc-
tion of a Markov model for any but the simplest system
can be tedious and error prone.
To exploit the relative advantages of both fault trees
and Markov models, while avoiding many of the short-
comings, we define a model that is flexible enough to
capture the dynamic aspects of the system, but which
is (almost) as easy to use as a standard fault tree The
model construction and solution process is facilitated by
the new model in three major ways, which are defined
and demonstrated via example in this tutorial.
• Behavioral decompos=t=on is used to separately define
models for system structure and fault recovery.
• Several additional gates are introduced into the fault
tree model to capture dynamic behavior.
• The fault tree model of system structure is internally
and automatically converted to a Markov model, to
which is added the fault recovery information.
These techniques have been implemented in HARP (the
Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor), a software
package for the analysis of advanced fault tolerant sys-
tems, developed by NASA Langley Research Center and
Duke University.
The models exampled described are all solved IJsing
HARP. For more information about the availability of
HARP, contact Sal Bavuso at the NASA Langley Re-
search Center, Mail Stop 478, Hampton, VA, (804) 8Ct-
6189. The techniques implemented in HARP are de-
scribed in more detail in other publications. References
[2, 10, 16, 19] are general papers describing HARP. More
details of the models presented here, as well as other mod-
els using HARP appear in [1, 4, 5, 11, 8]. Modeling tim
recovery process is covered in detail in [9].
2 Behavioral decomposition
A common approach to modeling complex systems con-
sists of structurally dividing the system into smaller sub-
systems (e.g. processors, memory units, buses), analyzing
the dependability of the subsystems separately, and then
combining the subsystem solutions to obtain the system
solution. A system level analysis can then be effected by
analyzing each subsystem separately and combining the
results to obtain the final solution. This structural de-
composition is allowed only if the subsystems' fault tol-
erant behaviors are mutually statistically independent.
An alternative to such a structural decomposition is
behavioral decomposition. Generally, the time scale for
the occurrence of faults and their associated errors is rel-
atively long (i.e. weeks or months) while the time scale
for recovery is relatively short (milliseconds). Behavioral
decomposition exploits this time scale difference, by al-
lowing an analyst to describe the two behavior types (oc-
currence and recovery) in separate models.
Using behavioral decomposition, the model is decom-
posed into fault-occurrence and repair (FORM) and fault
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Figure 1: Fault tree model of example system
Figure 2: Markov chain model of example system
and error handling (FEHM) submodels. The FORM con-
tains information about the structure of the system and
the fault arrival process. The FEHM (often called the
coverage model) allows for the modeling of permanent,
intermittent, and transient faults, and models the on-line
recovery procedure necessary for each fault type. We de-
scribe this process of model construction by way of a sim-
ple three processor, two memory (3P2M) example system.
2.1 The fault occurrence and repair
model (FORM)
We wish to model a computer consisting of three pro-
cessors and two shared memories (3P2M) communicating
over a shared bus. The system is operational as long as
one processor can communicate with one of the memo-
ries. We describe the system structure model as a fault
tree, as shown in figure 1, where the top event, System
Failure is caused by bus failure OR all processors failing,
OR both memories failing. The abbreviation for the com-
bined basic event i * j represent, i statistically indepen-
dent occurrences of component type j.
Figure 2 shows the (continuous time) Maxkov chain
Fsuit occurs
T_ Fault and Per_manen
Error
restorstlo_ Handling t
• Model Icoverage
exit I FEHM IexiL
SI$1ngle-p o_nL
failure exit
Figure 3: General structure of FEIIM
representation of the system whose fault tree is shown
in figure 1. The states are labeled with an ordered triple,
where element
1. denotes the number of operational processors,
2. denotes number of operational memories, and
3. denotes the state of the bus.
An arc between states (i,j,k) and (i- 1,j,k)is labeled
with i * A ( where I is the failure rate of processors).
Likewise, an arc between states (i,j, k) and (i,j- 1, k)is
labeled with j * p (where p is the failure rate of memory
unit.). The failure rate of the bus is a.
F1 represent, exhaustion of the processor cluster
F2 represents exhaustion of the memories, and
F3 represents failure of the bus.
The fault tree in figure 1 can be automatically con-
verted to the Markov chain in figure 2. All possible oc-
currences of basic events that leave the system operational
are enumerated; each combination becomes a state in the
Markov chain.
The advantage of allowing a fault tree description of the
system is that the modeler need not perform the tedious
task of determining the Markov chain representation of a
system that can be described as a fault tree. Very often,
a relatively simple fault tree can give rise to a very large
and complicated state space in the corresponding Markov
chain. The modeler can use the parsimony of the fault
tree representation of the system to generate the state
space of the Markov chain automatically, and then make
adjustments to the Markov chain as needed.
2.2 The fault and error handling model
(FEHM)
We next concentrate on modeling the detailed behavior
of the system when a fault occurs. The general structure
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of a model that represents the recovery proce_ that is
initiated when a fault occurs is shown in figure 3. The
entry point to the model signifies the occurrence of the
fault, and the three exits signify three possible outcomes.
The transient restoration exit (labeled R) represents the
correct rccog.itlon or a.d recovery from a tra,sie.t fault.
A I.r_umicltL iN tmually caum_d I)y cxLernltl ur q,llvironluell-
ta] factors, such as excessive heat or a "glitch" in the
power liue. It is generally believed that the vast majority
of faults are transient. Successful recovery from a tran-
sient fault restores the system to a consistent state with-
out discarding any components, for example by retrying
an instruction or rolling back to a previous checkpoint.
Reaching this exit successfully requires timely detection
of an error produced by the fault, performance of an ef-
fective recovery procedure, and the swift disappearance
of the fault (the cause of the error).
The permanent coverage exit (labeled C) denotes the
determination of the permanent nature of the fault, and
the successful isolation and removal of the faulty compo-
nent. The single point failure exit (labeled S) is reached
when a single fault causes the system to crash. This gen-
erally occurs if an undetected error propagates through
the system, or if the faulty unit cannot be isolated and
thus the system cannot be reconfigured.
As an example of a FEHM for the memory subsys-
tem of figure 1, assume that single-bit memory errors
(which are 98% of all memory faults) can be masked and
faults that affect more than one memory bit are 95% de-
tectable. Upon detection of a multiple memory error,
the affected portion of memory is discarded, the memory
mapping function is updated, and the needed informa-
tion is reloaded from a previous checkpoint and updated
to represent the current state of the system. The first two
moments I of the time to perform this recovery have been
determined by experiment to be 0.45 and 0.25 (time scale
in seconds). Experimentation also revealed that this re-
covery from the detected multiple memory errors is 85%
effective. It follows that a memory fault causes a single
point failure (in zero time) with probability 0.00385 [=
0.02 * (0.05 + 0.95'0.15)] if it causes multiple errors and
is not detected or is not recoverable. This behavior can be
captured in a FEHM model by providing the probability
of reaching each of the three exits and by providing the
first few moments of the time to reach each exit. Figure
4 is a pictorial representation of the recovery process for
the memory subsystem.
The recovery process for the faults that occur in the
processor is more complex. When a fault occurs in a
processor, a multi-step recovery process commences.
1. Wait for 0.1 second and do nothing, in the hope that
the fault is transient and will disappear.
z If, in successive experiments, recovery times are Tz, T_..... T_,
then the mean (first moment)is _ _-_. 1 Tj and the second moment
I ERROR OCCURS !
too,t,0,.I
I :;r?:rY 1 i mem°ryerr°rl
I error masked . 5
in zero time [ deksctsd I [ not I
transient [ / detectedIrestoration
I failure
exil
[ attempted exitR
I recovery $
I takes .45
I seconds
, succe sslUOIS_ui2ucce ssfull
reconflgurstton fsllure
exit exit
C S
Figure 4: Recovery model for memory subsystem
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Figure 5: ARIES transient fault recovery model
@ 1991 Anaua] RELIABI"L1TY AND 8AINTADIABILrrY Sy'mposu'um FCS - 3
1OO
2. Retry the offending computation several times,
which takes, say 0.5 seconds.
3. If the fault still persists, a rollback to a previous
checkpoint followed by recomputation is performed,
taking 2 seconds total.
4. If the fault still persists then it is assumed to be
permanent, and a permanent recovery process is ini-
tiated.
In all, there are up to 3 phase, of transient recovery, pos-
sibly followed by a permanent recovery. The 3 phases of
recovery succeed (i.e. the system is operational at the
conclusion of the phase) with probabilities 0, 0.5, and
0.8, respectively; the permanent recovery process suc-
ceeds with probability 0.875. The average lifetime of a
transient fault is 0.5 seconds. The ARIES transient recov-
ery model (shown in figure 5) represents a multi-phase re-
covery process that executes n successive recovery phases,
and is used to model the recovery process for processor
failures. The parameters shown on the ARIES model in
figure 5 are calculated from the input parameters that
describe the recovery process.
2.3 Near-coincident faults
In highly reliable systems, such as those used for flight
control, the probability of a second fault occurring while
attempting recovery from a given fault cannot be ignored.
The occurrence of a second, near-coincident fault (while
attempting to handle a single fault) causes immediate sys-
tem failure, if the second and first faults are critically
coupled. The modeler must designate which sets of faults
are critically coupled, or can assume either extreme: all
faults are critically coupled or no faults are critically cou-
pled. Once the set of critically coupled faults has been
determined, the calculation of the probability of near-
coincident faults is straightforward, given some measure
of the time spent in a recovery model. In the 3P2M ex-
ample, if a processor fails while a memory failure is being
handled, or during the recovery from a fault in another
processor, the system fails. If, however, a memory fails
during a processor recovery, no immediate failure occurs.
A bus failure would interfere with processor or memory
recovery.
A fourth exit is then added to the FEHM model, rep-
resenting the occurrence of a near-coincident fault be-
fore another exit is reached. Consequently, the probabil-
ity of reaching one of the original three exits is reduced
by a factor equaling the probability that an interfering
near-coincident fault does not occur. This single-entry 4-
exit model is then automatically inserted into the FORM
model, as described in the following section.
Cause of Failure Probability
Exhaustion of Proce_mors 2.20 x 10-_°
Exhaustion of Memories 1.61 x 10-10
Exhaustion of Busch 9.99 x 10 -s
Single Point Failure 3.53 x 10 -5
Near-Coincident Faults 4.49 x 10 -_°
Total Unreliability 4.53 x 10 -5
Table 1: Solution of 3P2M example system
2.4 Combining FORM and FEHM mod-
els
Once the FORM and FEHM models are described, they
are then combined. We demonstrate this process for the
Markov chain in figure 2 which results from the fault
tree in figure 1. For each failure of a redundant com-
ponent, the appropriate FEHM model is invoked. That
is, a FEHM model is inserted on each failure arc between
operational states in the Markov chain, as shown in figure
6. In the 3P2M example, the FEHMs on the horizontal
failure arcs are copies of the ARIES model (figure 5),
while the FEHMs on the vertical failure arcs are copies of
the memory coverage model (figure 4). Two failure states
are inserted:
• FSPF denoting the occurrence of a single-point fail-
ure, and
• FNCF denoting the occurrence of critically coupled
near-coincident faults.
Each FEttM model is then solved for the probability of
reaching each of its three exits, and the FEHM model is
replaced by a branch point. The resulting Markov chain
(see figure 7) is then solved for the reliability of the sys-
tem, which is given by the probability that the system is
not in any failure state.
Table 1 shows the results of the reliability analysis for
a 10 hour mission of the 3P2M example. For this model.
we assume that the failure rate of the processor ._ = 10 -4,
for the memory _t = 10 -s and for the bus tr = 10 -6 . Tile
largest contributor to the unreliability is single-point fail-
ure, that is, faults from which recovery is not successful.
3 Dynamic fault-tree gates
A major disadvantage of traditional fault tree analysis
is the inability of standard fault tree models to capture
sequence dependencies in the system, and still allow an
analytic solution. As an example of a sequence dependent
failure, consider a system with one active component and
one standby spare connected with a switch controller [15]
If the switch controller fails after the active unit fails (and
thus the standby is already in use), then the system carl
continue operation. However, if the switch controller fails
before the active unit fails, then the standby unit cannot
be switched into active operation and the system fails.
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Figure 6: Combination of FEIIM and FORM models
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Figure 7: Reduction of combined FEHM and FORM models
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Figure 8: Functional dependency gate Figure 9: Cold spare gate
Thus, the failure criteria depend not only on the com-
binations of events, but also on the sequence in which
events occur.
Systems with various sequence dependencies are usu-
ally modeled with Maxkov models. If, instead of using
standard fault tree solution methods, the fault tree is
converted to a Maxkov chain for solution, the expressive
power of a fault tree can be expanded by allowing cer-
tain kinds of sequence dependencies to be modeled by
defining special purpose gates to capture specific types of
sequence dependent behaviors. There are several different
kinds of sequence dependencies in fault tolerant systems.
This section identifies several such dependencies, and de-
fines specific gates to express these behaviors in fault tree
models. Part II demonstrate the use of these gate types
in several examples.
3.1 [kanctional dependency gate
Suppose that a system is configured such that the occur-
rence of some event (call it a trigger event) causes other
dependent components to become inaccessible or unus-
able. In this case, later failures of the dependent compo-
nents will not further affect the system and should not
be considered. A funchonal dependency gate {see figure
8) has a single trigger input (either a basic event or the
output of another gate in the tree), a non-dependent out-
put (reflecting the status of the trigger event) and one or
more dependent basic events. The dependent basic events
are functionally dependent on the trigger event. When
the trigger event occurs, the dependent basic events are
forced to occur. In the Markov chain generation, when a
state is generated in which the trigger event is satisfied,
all the associated dependent events are marked as having
occurred. The occurrence of any of the dependent basic
events has no effect on the trigger event.
The functional dependency gate is useful where com-
munication is achieved through some network interface el-
ements, where the failure of the network element isolates
the connected components. In this case, the failure of the
network element is the trigger event and the connected
components are the dependent events. Part II describes
several applications of the functional dependency gate.
3,2 Cold spare gate
Consider a system that utilizes cold spares, that is, spare
components that axe unpowered, and thus do not fail be-
fore being used. Such systems cannot be modeled exactly
using standard fault tree techniques because the system
failure criteria cannot be expressed in terms of combina-
tions of basic events, all using the same time frame.
We address this fault tree deficiency by introducing a
cold spare gate (see figure 9), with one primary input and
one or more alternate inputs. All inputs are basic events.
The primary input is the one that is originally powered
on, and the alternate input(s) specify the (initially un-
powered) components that are used as replacements for
the primary unit. The cold spare gate has one output
which becomes true after all the input events occur.
The conversion of the fault tree to a Markov chain
makes the consideration of cold spares possible. In a state
where the primary unit is operational, the cold spares are
not permitted ,'o fad. floweret, once the primary unit
has failed, then the first alternate unit can fail. After
the first alternate fails, the remaining alternates are al-
lowed to fail, one at a time in the order specified, unti[
the spares are exhausted. The possibility of being unable
to reconfigure correctly the spare unit into operation is
captured in the (separately specified) coverage model.
The functional dependency gate and the cold spare gate
can interact in an interesting way. Suppose that the spare
units are functionally dependent on some other (other-
wise unrelated) component. The occurrence of the trigger
event can render one or more of the spares unusable, even
if they have not been switched into active operation yet.
Then, if the primary unit fails, the spares are unavailable
to replace it. This is the one case where a spare can "fail"
even while it is unpowered Part II gives examples of the
use of the cold spare gate.
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Outputoccurs only if
both A and B occur
and A_before B
A B
Figure 10: Priority-AND gate
A before B before C
A B
Figure 11: Cascading priority-AND gates
3.3 Priority-AND gate
The priority-AND gate is logically equivalent to an AND
gate, with the added condition that the events must occur
in a specific order. The priority-AND gate (as shown
in figure 10) has two inputs, A and B. The output of
the gate is true if both A and B have occurred, and if
A occurred before B. If both events have not occurred,
or if B occurred before A then the gate does not fire.
To represent the behavior that A occurs before B which
occurs before C, the priority-AND gates can be cascaded
as shown in figure 11.
Gate Output
Figure 12: Sequence enforcing gate
3.4 Sequence enforcing gate
The sequence enforcing gate forces events to occur in a
particular order. The input events are constrained to oc-
cur in the left-to-right order in which they appear under
the gate (i.e., the leftmc_t event must occur before the
event on its immediate right which must occur before the
event on its immediate right is allowed to occur, etc.}.
There may be any number of inputs (see figure 12), the
first of which may be a (po_ibly replicated) basic event
or the output of some other gate. All inputs other than
the first are limited to being (po_ibly replicated) basic
events. The sequence enforcing gate can be contrasted
with the priority-AND gate in that the priority-AND gate
detects whether events occur in a particular order (the
events can occur in any order) where the sequence enforc-
ing gate will only allow the events to occur in a specified
order.
In the generation of a Markov chain from a fault tree
containing a sequence enforcing gate, states that repre-
sent any other ordering than that specified by the se-
quence enforcing gate are never generated. In part 2 of
this tutorial we will show an interesting application of the
sequence enforcing gate to model pooled spares.
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Part II
Examples
We study several examples of advanced fault tolerant sys-
tems, and develop fault tree models to analyze the reli-
ability of these systems. The models ate all solved with
HARP, the Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor, de-
veloped at NASA Langley Research Center and Duke
University. The parameters used for these model and the
details of the recovery mechanism are pure conjecture,
and should not be interpreted as a factual representation
of the parameters associated with the systems.
4 Cm*: a loosely-coupled dis-
tributed system
4.1 System description
An instance of the Cm*system (shown in figure 13) con-
sists of 2 clusters of processors and memories connected
by links [18]. Each cluster consists of 4 local switch inter-
face controllers (S.Iocals), each attached to one processor
and one 12K memory module. Each processor has 4K of
memory on board. The K.map is a cluster controller con-
necting the S.Iocals; the clusters are connected by inter-
cluster communications (L.zac). A fault in the K.map
renders the associated S.Iocals (and their connected pro-
cessors and memories) inaccessible, while a fault in an
S.Iocal makes the processor and memory modules con-
nected to it inaccessible.
The Cm* system exhibits three characteristics that are
typical of reliable distributed systems.
i. There are functional interdependencies which can
make the development of the fault tree model diffi-
cult, for example, the dependence of the accessibility
of ti:, processors and memories on the state of the
S. locals.
2 There are many potential system states: since there
are 27 components, the system can be in any one of
2_7 > 134 million states, if any component can be in
one of two states, functional and failed.
3. There are many failure modes: there are 5405 min-
imal cut sets for this system (a cut set is a set of
components whose failure causes the system to fail).
4.2 Failure criteria
The system is considered operational as long as there are
3 processors that can communicate with 3 memories. As
long as the L.inc is operational, these requirements can
be satisfied by the components of both clusters. But, if
the L.Inc fails, the requirements must be met within one
cluster.
tick
$$
Figure 14: Fault tree model of Cm* system
4.3 Fault tree model
The development of the fault tree model of the Cm* sys-
tem is simplified by the use of a functional dependency
gate, to capture the interconnection dependencies. A
fault tree model of the Cm* system is shown in figure
14. System failure (the top event) can be attributed to
one of two causes which are shown as inputs into the up-
permost OR gate. Failure occurs when either the L.inc
fails and the requirements cannot be satisfied by a sin-
gle cluster (the left input to the uppermc_t OR gate), or
(independent of the state of the L.inc) there are an in-
sufficient total number of processors or memories in both
clusters. The output of an m/n gates is true when m of
the n input events have occurred.
The functional dependencies of the S.iocsls on the
K. maps and of the processors and memories on the asso-
ciated S.Iocal are captured in the functional dependency
gates (FDEP) shown in figure 14. In this case, there
were no explicit reliability requirements concerning the
K.maps or S.Iocah, so the functional dependency gate
is not explicitly connected to the top event in the fault
tree. In order to solve a fault tree model containing func-
tional dependency gates via standard combinatorial solu-
tion methods, we need to convert the model to a strictly
combinatorial one. To accomplish this conversion, the
dependency gates can be replaced with OR gates in the
following manner. For each occurrence of a dependent
basic event, replace that basic event with a logical OR of
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Figure 13: A diagram of the Cm* system.
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Figure 15: Fault tree model of Cm* system without functional dependency gates
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Figure 16: An AIPS I/O network used for example cal-
culations
the basic event and its trigger event. Thus in the Cm*
system, each 'basic event representing a processor failure
is replaced by a logical OR of that processor event, its
S.Iocal and its K.map. Memory events are altered in a
similar manner. The fault tree that results from replac-
ing the functional dependency gates is shown in figure 15.
The replacement of the functional dependency gates only
produces a correct result if no FEHM models are used,
that is, if all faults are permanent and are instantaneously
and perfectly covered.
5 AIPS: a system of fault-
tolerant building blocks
5.1 System description
An example of the AIPS (Advanced Information Process-
ing System) I/O network is shown in figure 16. The AIPS
system, designed at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory,
is intended to provide fault-tolerant building blocks that
can be used for a variety of real-time control applications
[12]. The AIPS I/0 network might be used in a flight con-
trol system, and consists of 3 rings, each of which contains
5 nodes. Three of the nodes on each ring (those labeled A,
B, E) are connected to sensors and/or actuators. Each
such device is triplicated, with one copy of each device
connected to each ring, via a node in the same location
(with the same letter label). The remaining two nodes,
C and D, are termed root nodes because they provide the
connections to the triplicated computers.
5.2 Failure criteria and parameters
The I/O network fails when
1. Nodes in the same location on two different rings
either fail or become isolated from both root connec-
tions, OR
2. if 2 of the 3 computers fail or become disconnected
from both rings, OR
3. when 2 of the three rings become disconnected from
both computers.
As long as a node can communicate with one computer, it
can communicate with all computers that are up because
the computers are assumed to be connected by a perfectly
reliable interconnect|on mechanism (such as shared mem-
ory). For the purpose of this analysis we consider only the
1/O network and the computer connections, and not the
possible failures of the devices (such as sensors and ac-
tuators) connected to the nodes. The failure parameters
used for this analysis are
• Node failure rate: 6 x 10 -e per hour
* Link failure rate: 12x 10 -s per hour
* Computer failure rate: 10 -4 per hour
5.3 Fault recovery
Recovery from faults in nodes and links is assumed to
be perfect and instantaneous. For the computers, how-
ever, more detailed coverage modeling is necessary. It
is assumed that 85 percent of the faults that occur m
the computer system are transient, with the remaining 15
percent being permanent or intermittent in nature. Re-
covery from computer faults is assumed to be perfect, but
not instantaneous: the time to recover from a transient
is 1 second, while the time to recover from a permanent
or intermittent is uniformly distributed between 1 and 5
seconds. During the recovery interval, if a second, near-
coincident fault occurs in either of the other computers,
the recovery is interrupted, and system loss is conserva-
tively assumed to occur.
5.4 Fault tree model
The fault tree model of the AIPS l/O network ha.s 102
nodes, including 39 basic events, and is too large to be
presented here as a whole, ttowever, figure 17 is a sketch
of the fault tree with some of the paths complete. The
system fails when one of the seven triplicated subsystems
fail (hence seven 2/3 gates are connected to the top OR
gate), these being node groups A through E, the comput-
ers, and the root connections between the rings and the
computers. A representative of each of the 7 subsystems
is shown in detail; the other members of each triplicated
subsystem are analogous. The results of the solution of
this model appear in table 2.
5.5 Truncated fault tree
An interesting alternative to the development of the full
fault tree model is the concept of a truncated fault tree
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Full Fault Tree Model Solution
AIPS I/O Network Example System
Truncation Level 1 Component Failure 2 Component Failures
Size Of Truncated Model 42 states, 190 transitions 770 states, 5155 transitions
Lower Bound on Unreliability 0.125e-6 0.126e-6
Upper Bound on Unreliability 2.94e-6 0.128e-6
Total Run Time 65 CPU seconds 1295 CPU seconds
Table 2: Solution of example AIPS system
A I
b ¢
Figure 17: Fault tree model of AIPS I/O network
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Figure 18: Truncated fault tree model of AIPS network
For the AIPS network (figure 16), the expansion of only
2 failure levels produced a reasonably accurate estimate
of the system unreliability. For this ease, we could have
produced a similar result with a much simpler fault tree,
one which explicitly defined only the 2 component failure
combinations. Consider the fault tree representation of
the AIPS network in figure 18. The top event of this tree
is 2-component failure system loss, where the system loss is
caused by losing 2 members of any triplicated subsystem.
No combination of 2 link failures, or one link failure and
one other component failure can lead to system failure,
and so the link basic events do not input to any gates in
the truncated fault tree. The presence of these dangl|n 9
basic events (basic events that do not input to any gate
in the fault tree) can be used to bound the failure prob-
ability, if the dangling basic events are ignored then the
solution of tile fault tree gives an optimistic estimate of
the unreliability of the system.
If we are using a strictly combinatorial solution
method, we can use the dangling basic events to deter-
mine the upper bound on the unreliability by using a
k-out-of-n gate. Connect all n basic events (those that
are dangling as well as those that are not) to an 3-out-of-
n gate (a gate that is activated on the third component
failure), and OR its output with tile top event of the tree.
This is equivalent to assuming that the third component
failure causes system failure.
If we need to include the effects of imperfect coverage
in the model, we can use the dangling basic events in con-
junction with the conversion of the fault tree to a Markov
chain. As the Markov chain state space is expanded, all
the basic events become part of the state definition. The
resulting Markov chain can be used to produce bounds
on the unreliability of the system from the solution of
the truncated fault tree. It is not necessary in this case
to add the m-out-of-n gate as was done with the strictly
combinatorial solution. The basic events are simply left
dangling. The presence of dangling basic events is cru-
cial to the determination of correct bounds on the system
unreliability.
The solution of the truncated Markov chain corre-
sponding to the truncated fault tree of the AIPS system
is shown in table 3. A comparison of the numbers in this
table with those in table 2, shows that the truncated fault
tree can give reasonable results. The time needed by a
reliability analyst to determine a truncated fault tree is
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Truncated Fault Tree Model Solution
AIPS I/O Network Example System
Truncation Level I Component Failure 2 Component Failures
Size Of Truncated Model 42 states, 190 transitions 770 states, 4879 transitions
Lower Bound on Unreliability
Upper Bound on Unreliability
Total Run Time
0.126e-6 0.1261e-6
0.640e-6 O.1263e-6
58 CPU seconds 1144 CPU seconds
Table 3: Solution of truncated fault tree model of AIPS system
Network elementa. NE3
Processing
elements
1
7/ ,
_ _ecl_ndary
laUl.L .
coatalnment
region
Figure 19: An instance of the fault tolerant parallel pro-
celgflor
substantially less than the time required to derive a com-
plete fault tree model of a system. Further, the combi-
nation of a truncated solution technique and a truncated
fault tree can allow more faith to be placed in the model,
since if there are missing failure combinations they may
be accounted for by the bounding technique.
6 FTPP: Fault tolerant parallel
processor
6.1 System description
Next we consider several models of the FTPP (Fault Tol-
erant Parallel Processor) [14, 13] cluster, to compare var-
ious configurations of triads with spares. An instance of
an FTPP cluster is shown in figure 19, and consists of 16
processing elements (PE), with 4 connected to each of 4
network elements (NE). The network elements are fully
connected. In the clusters modeled here, the 16 proces-
sors are logically connected to form 4 triads, each with
one spare. We investigate three triad/spare configura-
tions, the first two with hot spares and the third with
cold spares:
#1 utilizes hot spares; there is one spare for each triad
and all spares are attached to the same network ele-
ment.
# 2 also uses hot spares; there is one spare on each net-
work element and the spare PE can substitute for any
failed PE attached to the same network element.
# 3 is the same as #1, with all spares on the same NE,
but in configuration #3 the spares are cold.
The processing elements in all three configurations
functionally depend on the network element to which they
are connected. If a network element experiences a perma-
nent failure, the processing elements connected to it are
then considered failed.
6.2 Failure criteria and parameters
For all models, a triad fails when it has fewer than 2 active
components; the system fails if any triad fails. Failures
occur at a constant rate of I.I x 10 -4 per hour for pro-
cessing elements, and 1.7 x 10 -5 per hour for network
elements.
6.3 Fault recovery
Recovery and reconfiguration from faults in processing el-
ements are both perfect, but take a non-zero amount of
time. lfa second fault occurs in any other component dur-
ing attempted reco-_ery from a first fault, the system fails.
Half of the faults that occur in the processing elements are
transient, and can be recovered from without discarding
the affected component. The remainder of faults are per-
manent. The time to recover is exponentially distributed
with a mean of 3.6 seconds. Coverage of NE failures is
both instantaneous and perfect.
6.4 Fault tree models
6.4.1 Configuration _1
Configuration #1 (shown in figure 20) divides the active
elements of a triad among NE1, NE$ and NE3, and uses
the PE's on NE_ as spares. The PE's that are in the same
relative position on the first three network elements form
a triad, and the PE in the same relative position on NE_
serves as a hoe (active) spare for the triad.
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Figure 21: Fault tree model for configuration #1
Q
I Hgi
Figure 20: Configuration #1 with one spare per triad
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Figure 22: Configuration #2 with one spare per NE
The fault tree model for configuration #1, shown in
figure 21, uses four functional dependency gates (FDEP)
to reflect the dependence of the processing elements on
the network elements. The FDEP gates are not explic-
itly connected to the other gates in the tree, since the
reliability requirements (all 4 triads must be operational)
do not explicitly mention the network elements. Figure
21 shows four 3/4 gates connected to the top OR gate,
one 3/4 gate for each triad. A triad fails when only one
element remains (3 of the 4 elements have failed).
6.4.2 Configuration #2
© 1991 .4.nual RIK$.ABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY _/x_it_ FTS - 13
110
Configuration#2 is an FTPP cluster with hot spares dis-
tributed across the network elements instead of grouped
on the same network element (see figure 22). The spare
element on each network element can substitute for any
failed PE connected to the same NE. That is, processing
element TSt can substitute for a failed PE connected to
NEI.
The fault tree model of this system is a bit more com-
plex than the one presented in section 6.4.1, and is shown
in figure 23. The functional dependency gates FDEP
again reflect the dependence of the processing elements
on the network elements. A triad failure is again at-
tributed to losing the majority of operational elements,
but it is more difficult to describe the failure of a member
of the triad. A member of the triad is failed if it and
its spare fail or if its spare is not available when needed.
The spare is not available if some other PE on the same
NE fails and uses the spare before it is needed by the
first PE For example, in figure 23, the leftmost OR gate
that inputs into the leftmost 2/3 gate represents the fail-
ure of the first member of the first triad. This member
fails if both Tlt (the first member of the first triad) and
its spare (TSt) fail, or if the spare is being used because
another failure has already occurred when Tll fails. The
spare will already be in use when Tlt fails if either T2_ or
T3z (the other two active components on the same NE)
have failed before Tll does. This condition is reflected in
the Priority-AND gate that inputs to the same OR gate.
There is a similar structure of AND and Priority-AND
gates to represent the failure of the other members of the
triads.
6.4.3 Configuration #3
The third configuration is used to investigate the effect on
reliability of keeping the spares unpowered until needed
The FTPP configuration modeled in this section is the
same as configuration #1 (figure 20) except that the
spares are cold rather than hot. There is one spare for
each triad, and all spares are connected to the same net-
work element. The fault tree model for this system, shown
in figure 24, uses the cold spare gate. There is one cold
spare gate for each member of each triad, where the ini-
tially active members of the triad are used as the primary
inputs. The basic event representing the cold spare PE is
connected to all three cold spare gates since it can sub-
stitute for any of the elements.
6.5 Results
This section presents the results obtained from solution
of the models of the three FTPP configurations for a mis-
sion length of 10 hours. Table 4 contains a compares the
reliability of the three configurations. We solved a trun-
cated model (described in more detail later in this section)
which produces bounds on the unreliability from a partial
solution of the model. Table 4, shows the bounds on the
unreliability,and the best case (optimistic)estimate of
the probabilities of exhaustion of network elements (exh
N E), exhaustion of processing elements (exh PE) and near
coincident failures (NCF).
Configuration #2 (that distributed the hot spares
across the network elements) not only required a more
complicated faulttreeforanalysis,but alsowas apprecia-
bly lessreliablethan configuration#I. In configuration
#2, the failureof 2 network elements (alone)can killthe
system, sincethe failureof 2 network elements removes
2 members from at leastone triad.For example, ifNEt
and NEg both fail,then Tit and TI_ are both disabled,
and no spare isavailableto replacethem (because of the
functionaldependencies).The solutionof the model for
configuration#2 shows that the predominant cause of
failureisthe exhaustion of network elements. In config-
uration #I, the lossof 2 network elements (alone) does
not cause any triadto fail,even though itcan render all
the spare elements unusable.
In the #3 configuration,the spare elements remained
unpowered untilneeded, resultingin a modest decrease
inunreliability.Sincenear-coincidentfailurescontributed
more highly to the unreliabilityof the system, the effect
of keeping the PEs unpowered was not as significantas
might be expected.
For allthreemodels, the Markov chain was truncated
after the considerationof 2 or 3 faults,and so a pair
of bounds on the actual reliabilitywere generated. The
bounds were tightenough afteronly considering2 faults
forconfiguration#2, but we needed to consider a larger
model for the other two cases. The reason that the
bounds were tighterfor configuration#2 is that there
were a significantnumber of failurestatesencountered
when only considering2 component failures.In the #I
and #3 configurations,therewere not many failurestates
with only 2 failedcomponents. Unfortunately,the num-
ber of statesin a Markov chain increasesexponentially.
with the number of component failuresconsidered,so the
increasein accuracy isaccompanied by a large increase
in solutiontimes.Table 5 compares the resultsobtained
from the smaller model (truncated after2 failures)and
the largermodel (truncated after3 failures),as well_.s
the sizeof the models and the run time forthe complete
generation and solution of the model on a DECstation
3100.
7 ASID MAS: a mission avionics
system
7.1 System Description
The AS1D (Advanced System Integration Demonstration)
project was the first large scale effort in the development
of the PAVE PILLAR architecture for advanced tactical
fighters. The Boeing Military Airplane Company was one
of five contractors who designed implementations of the
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Figure 23: Fault tree model for configuration #2
[ Configuration
(Best Case) Unreliability
(Worst Case) Unreliability
(Best case)exh. NE
(Best case)exh. PE
(Best case) NCF
H #2: Hot spare per NE
0.207 x 10-6
0.417 x I0-s
0.174 x 10-6
0.327 x I0-s
0.302 x I0-z
#1: tlot spare per triad
0.135 x 10 -s
0.910 x 10 -s
0.302 x 10 -_
#3: Cold spare per triad
0.264 x 10 -z
0.266 x 10 -'r
0.104 x 10 -s
Table 4: Results of the solution of all three FTPP models
[ Configuration #2: Hot spare/NE ] #I: Hot spare/triad ] #3: Cold spare/triad]
Truncated at 2 component allures
(Best Case) Unreliability
(Worst Case) Unreliability
Number of states
Number of transitions
: Runtime (CPU seconds)
0.207 x 10 -_
0.417 x 10 -e
201
877
138
0.406 x 10 -z
0.242 x 10 -e
123
581
99
0.263 x 10 -z
0.132 x 10 -e
225
817
99
Truncated at 3 component failures
(Best Case) Unreliability
(Worst Case) Unreliability
Number of states
Number of transitions
Runtime (CPU seconds)
analysis not
necessary for
tAis ezample
0.406 x 10 -¢
0.407 x 10 -7
961
5469
2653
0.264 x 10 -7
0.266 x 10 -7
2307
9777
5055
Table 5: Comparison of accuracy and model size
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Figure 24: Fault tree model for configuration #3 with one COLD spare per triad
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PAVE PILLAR project. A unique feature of the Boeing
implementation [3] is the use of dual processor pairs wher-
ever a single processor is required. This processor-pair
uses comparison monitoring so as to achieve very high lev-
els of error detection. For critical functions, high levels of
reliability are assured by using redundant processor-pairs
in duplex or triplex mode. We analyze the reliability of
the critical functions of the mission avionics subsystem of
the ASID system.
There are several critical functions within the mission
avionics system (MAS). The loss of any of these func-
tions causes the system to fail. These critical functions
include the vehicle management system (VMS), the crew
station control and display functions, mission and systems
management, local path generation, and scene and obsta-
cle following functions. The vehicle management system
provides airframe control, including flight and propulsion
control, as well as providing utility systems management
and control. The crew station subsystem displays infor-
mation to the pilot, contains mechanisms for pilot control
actions, and manages crew station activity. The mission
and systems management subsystem allocates resources
for real time control functions.
Figure 25 is a block diagram of the architecture of the
critical mission avionics system. One processing unit is
required for the crew station functions, local path genera-
tion, and mission and system management. Each of these
processing units is supplied with a hot spare backup to
take over control if the primary processor should detect
an error. Each of the processing units is really a pair of
tightly coupled processors so as to maximize the proba-
bifity of fault detection and minimize latency. Although
there are really 4 active processors for each of these func-
tions, we treat the processor-pairs as a single processing
unit, since they are not used independently. When a mis-
match of results is detected, both members of the pro-
cessing pair are removed from the system. Figure 25 thus
shows that there are two processing units for these func-
tions, where one is the primary unit and the other is a
hot spare.
The scene and obstacle and VMS subsystems both re-
quire more functionality than one processing unit can pro-
vide, and thus each use 2 processing units. The scene and
obstacle processing units are also replicated, providing a
hot spare backup. The VMS system is triplicated, pro-
viding 2 hot spare backups.
In addition to the hot spare backups, 2 additional pools
of spares are provided, each containing 2 spare processing
units. The first pool can be used to cover the first 2
processor failures in the subsystems other than the VMS;
the second pool covers the first 2 failures in the VMS
subsystem.
The subsystems are connected via 2 triplicated bus sys-
tems, the first being a data bus and the second being the
mission management bus. The replicated memory system
is connected to the data bus. The VMS has an additional
triplicated bus, the vehicle management bus.
7.2 Failure criteria and parameters
The system fails if any of the functions cannot be per-
formed, or if both of the 2 memories fail, or if all 3 of any
one type of bus fail. The following MTBF (mean time be-
tween failures) values, giving rise to the following failure
rates, were used.
• proce_or pairs: 40,000 hours; failure rate: 2.5 x 10 -s
• buses: 400,000 hours; failure rate: 2.5 x 10 -6
• memories: 1,000,000 hours; failure rate: 1.0 x 10 -6
7.3 Fault recovery
Fault detection is perfect (because of the processing pairs)
but it takes between 0.5 second and 5 seconds (uni-
formly distributed) for recovery to occur. If a second,
near-coincident failure occurs during this interval, we say
that the system fails because of near-coincident fa:lures
(NCF).
7.4 Fault tree model
The fault tree model of the minion avionics system is
complicated by the presence of the pooled spares. For
ease of exposition, we first present a fault tree model that
ignores the pooled spares. We then describe the method-
ology for modeling pooled spares via a fault tree with
sequence dependency gates, by way of a simple example.
Finally, we define the full fault tree model of the mission
avionics subsystem including the pooled spares.
7.4.1 Fault tree with no pooled spares
The fault tree model of the mission avionics subsystem
with no pooled spares is shown in figure 26. This fault
tree shows that the system fails if any of the critical func-
tions fail, or if either of the bus systems fail, or if both
memories fail. There are 3 types of components in the
example system, processing units (type 1), buses (type 2)
and memories (type 3). The crew station, for example,
uses 2 components of type 1, so its basic event is labeled
2 * 1. The memory system uses 2 memories and is thus
labeled 2 * 3, while the mission management bus system
uses three buses and is labeled 3"* 2.
7.4.2 Modeling pooled spares
Before we add the pooled spares to the fault tree model
of the mission avionics system, consider a simple system
with two duplexes and 2 pooled spares. The fault tree
model of a 2 duplex system is shown in figure 27, while
the equivalent Markov chain is shown in figure 28. This
equivalent Markov chain is determined automatically by
HARP.
Next, consider the desired Markov chain representation
of the same 2-duplex system with the addition of 2 pooled
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Figure 25: Block diagram of mission avionics system architecture
I CRITICAL SYSTEM FAILURE J
B_
5":
Figure 26: Fault tree model of mission avionics system with no pooled spares
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Figure 27: Fault tree model of a 2-duplex system
Figure 28: Markov chain model of a 2-duplex system
1,
Figure 29: Markov chain model of a 2-duplex system with
2 pooled spares
Figure 30: Fault tree model of s 2-duplex system with 2
pooled spares
spares (figure 29). The 2 pooled spares cause 2 states
to be added to the front of the Markov chain. These 2
state_ represent the first 2 failures in the system which will
deplete the spares. After the first 2 failures, 2 functioning
duplexes remain, and the rest of the Markov chain in
figure 29 is identical to that in figure 28.
We can use the fault tree shown in figure 30 to represent
the 2-duplex system with 2 pooled spares. In figure 30,
the combination of the 2/6 gate (which fires after the
first 2 of 6 failures) and the FDEP gate creates s Markov
chain that models the first 2 failures of 6 components.
After the first 2 failures, the FDEP gate stops any more
of the 6 components from failing. The two SEQ gates in
figure 30 do not allow the two basic events labeled with
1 * 2 to begin to fail until after the 2/6 gate h_ fired.
After the 2/6 gate has fired, then the rest of the fault
tree (which is identical to the one in figure 27 can occur
as usual. This combination of FDEP and 5EQ gates can
be used in a more general setting to tie multiple Markov
chains together.
7.4.3 Full model and results
Figure 31 is tile full fault tree model of tile mission avion-
ics system, including the pools of spares. The leftmost
FDEP and SEQ gates show the 2 spares for the vehicle
management system, while those to the right represent
the other 2 spares.
Because of the sequence dependency gates, this fault
tree cannot be solved by standard combinatorial meth-
ods, but rather must be converted to a Markov chain for
solution. HARP performs this conversion automatically,
and produces a truncated Markov chain with 479 states
and 2517 transitions. The Markov model is truncated af-
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Figure 31: Full fault tree model of mission avionics system
ter considering 5 component failures. Instead of produc-
ing an exact reliability estimate, bounds that encompass
the reliability of the full model are produced. For a 200
hour interval, the unreliability lies between 1.138 x 10 -_
and 1.146 x 10 -7.
8 Three fault tolerant hypercube
architectures
We next model three fault tolerant hypercube architec-
tures. All three contain 8 processing nodes connected
in a hypercube of dimension 3. All three consist of 2
fault-tolerant modules with each module containing 4 pro-
cessing nodes. The three architectures differ in the ways
that spare nodes are incorporated into the fault-tolerant
modules, in the way that messages are routed between
processing nodes, and in the architecture of the individ-
ual processing nodes. The architectures are described in
more detail in a paper that appears in the proceedings of
this symposium [5] and are discussed only briefly here.
8.1 System description
8.1.1 Architecture 1
Architecture 1 is based on the hierarchical approach to
sparing proposed by Rennels[17] and is depicted in figure
32. It consists of 2 fault tolerant modules of processing
nodes. Each module contains 4 processing nodes and one
spare node. The spare is connected by a port to each of
the 4 active processors in the module.
The processing nodes themselves are comprised of 5
individual processors (4 active processors and a spare)
which communicate over an bus and share a memory
module. The memory module contains spare bit planes
and spare chips within a bit plane. The proce_ing node is
connected to its neighboring nodes in the hypercube by 4
ports. Three ports communicate across the three dimen-
sions of the hypercube, and the fourth port communicates
with the spare processing node of the module.
8.1.2 Architecture 2
Architecture 2, also depicted in figure 32, is identical to
Architecture I except that the ports within each pro-
cessing node are replaced by hyperswitch ports[7]. The
hyperswitch allows an adaptive routing method to avoid
failed or congested links within the hypercube. It permits
any 2 nodes of the hypercube to communicate as long as
there exists any nonfailed path between them anywhere
throughout the hypercube.
8.1.3 Architecture 3
Architecture 3[6], depicted in figure 33, differs from archi-
tectures 1 and 2 in several important ways. Processing
nodes are again configured into 2 fault tolerant modules
(each containing 4 active processing nodes and one spare),
however the inter-node connections are mediated by de-
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Figure 32: Architecture 1 (Rennels)
coupling switches rather than being direct connections be-
tween ports of neighboring nodes. The hypercube connec-
tivity and the switching of spares online and failed nodes
offline is performed using these decoupling switches[6].
The switches are intended to be comparatively simple de-
vices. One consequence of using the switches to control
access to the spare nodes is that the spares cannot provide
redundancy for links a.s was possible for architectures I
and 2.
The processing nodes of the hypercube are much sim-
pler and contain processors that are much less powerful
that those of architectures 1 and 2. Each processing node
consists of 2 processors which perform identical compu-
tations in parallel. The output is compared to detect
faults. A recovery module is responsible for fault han-
dling upon the detection of a processor fault. The node
may either declare itself failed or attempt a reconfigura-
tion to a simplex configuration upon detection of such a
processor fault. Both processors have access to a single
memory module and a DMA (direct memory access) mod-
ule. Finally, each processing node communicates with the
outside world through three ports, each of which connects
the node to its neighbor across one dimension of the hy-
percube.
For this discussion we examine only the processing
nodes of the various candidate architectures in isolation
from the ensemble. The processing nodes of each archi-
tecture themselves can be configured in a variety of ways.
The configuration chosen can affect the reliability and
Figure 33: Architecture 3 (Chau and Liestman)
power consumption of the node, which can in turn affect
the overall ensemble reliability of the hypercube multi-
processor.
8.2 Failure criteria and parameters
The processor nodes for architectures 1 and 2 are identi-
cal, so their failure criteria are closely related. The differ-
ence between them is due to the message routing scheme
employed by each architecture. A processor node for ar-
chitectures 1 and 2 will fail if:
• the memory fails OR
• the bus fails OR
• 2 out of the 5 processors fail (the first processor fail-
ure is presumably recovered from by switching in the
spare to take the failed processor's place) OR
• the node is disconnected from the other processing
nodes in the hypercube.
The events that cause a node to be disconnected differ for
the two architectures.
The routing algorithm used for architecture 1 allows
only one path between each pair of nodes in tile hyper-
cube. Since the spare processing node in each of the two
fault tolerant modules can relay messages within the mod-
ule when a direct connection between 2 nodes in the mod-
ule is not possible, it takes the failure of 2 of the four ports
in a processing node to disconnect the node. In Architec-
ture 2, a hyperswitch is used instead of the single path
routing algorithm, so that all four ports in a node must
fail in order to disconnect the node.
A processing node for architecture 3 fails if:
• the memory fails OR
• the DMA unit fails OR
• both processors fail OR,
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• since the single path routing algorithm is used for
this architecture, the node will fail if any of its 3
ports fail.
The component failure rates for all three architectures
are listed below.
Active processor (architectures 1 and 2): 1.990x 10 -s
per hour
Active processor (architecture 3): 2.306 x 10 -7 per
hour
• Warm spare processor(architecture 2): 1.0 x 10 -s per
hour
Shared Memory (architectures 1 and 2): 3.477 x 10 -7
per hour
Memory (architecture 3): 1.147 x 10 -7 per hour
DMA module (architecture 3): 3.477 x 10 -7 per hour
Intra-node bus(architectures I and 2): 1.147 x 10 -7
per hour
Hyperswitch and I/O port (all architectures):
3.477 x 10 -7 per hour
8.3 Fault recovery
The FEHM used for the processors assumes that a pro-
censor failure can be detected, located, and the spare suco
cessfully switched in to replace the failed processor 95%
of the time, and that the time required to do all of this
is uniformly distributed between 0.9 seconds and 1.1 sec-
onds. The remaining 5% of the time the reconfiguration
attempt does not succeed, leading to node failure. The
FEHM used for the ports assumes detection and deacti-
vation of a failed port is successful 98% percent of the
time, and that the time required for this is exponentially
distributed with a mean of 0.1 sec. Again, the remaining
2% of the time a port failure is not suece_fully detected,
leading to node failure. No transient restoration is at-
tempted, i.e., all failures are considered to be permanent.
8.4 Fault tree models
8.4.1 Hot spares
Figures 34 and 35 model the processing nodes in archi-
tectures 1 and 2 when the spare processor in the node is
a hot spare (the spare is powered on and operating all the
time) and hence fails at the same rate as the active pro-
cessors. The fault trees differ only in the modeling of port
failures, as architecture 1 fails when 2 of the four ports
fail (hence the 2/4 gate), while architecture 2 doesn't fail
until all four ports have failed (hence the AND gate). Fig-
ure 36 depicts a fault tree model for the processing nodes
of architecture 3.
[ Node fails I
Figure 34: Fault tree model of architecture 1 processing
node with hot spares
I Node fails ]
Figure 35: Fault tree model of Architecture 2 processing
node with hot spares
INode fails]
Figure 36: Fault tree model of Architecture 3 processing
node with hot spares
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8.4.2 Cold spares
Power consumption by a multiprocessor with spare nodes
can be reduced by having the spares be cold spares, un-
powered until they are needed to replace a failed active
processor. A cold spare processor cannot fail until it is
activated and brought online. In HARP this type of con-
figuration is modeled using the Cold Spare gate, as de-
picted in figure 37 by a fault tree for architecture 2. The
cold spare gate ensures that the spare processor does not
fail until one of the 4 active processors fail. The 2/5 gate
in parallel with the cold spare gate maintains the require-
ment that 2 processor failures cause the node to fail. Such
a configuration not only reduces power consumption, but
also enhances the reliability of the processing node.
8.4.3 Warm spares
Instead of being unpowered, the spare may be partially
powered up. It may then fail before being activated but at
a lesser rate than the active processors. Such a processor
is called a warm spare and can be modeled in IIARP us-
ing the Sequence Enforcing gate as shown in figure 38 for
architecture 2. In this example two pseudo-components
(appearing as inputs to the OR gate whose output feeds
into the Functional Dependency gate) are used to rep-
resent the 4 active processors and spare before any pro-
cessor failures. Upon the first failure of a processor (ei-
ther active or spare), these two pseudo-components are
"turned off" as far as the fault tree is concerned by the
Functional Dependency gate. The 4 remaining proces-
sors, now all active, are represented by the _4*processor"
basic event which appears as the rightmost input to the
Sequence Dependency gate. This basic event had been
"turned off" prior to the first processor failure by the
Sequence Enforcing gate. After the first processor fail-
ure, the leftmost input to the Sequence Enforcing gate is
turned on, which "turns on" the basic event that is its
rightmost input (i.e. the processors of this basic event
are now permitted to fail). Note that because this ba-
sic event is also an input to the top OR gate of the hult
tree, a subsequent failure of any of the 4 processors will
cause the node to fail, again maintaining the requirement
that failure of 2 of the 5 procemmrs cause node failure. Al-
though a spare does not fail while unpowered, upon power
up and activation there can be some probability that the
spare does not operate properly. Such a situation can be
modeled as a warm spare.
8.5 Results
Figure 39 compares the I0 year unreliabilities of the pro-
ceasing nodes of each of the three architectures assuming
all of them use hot spares. The unreliability of the ar-
chitecture 3 processing nodes is much lower that those
for architectures 1 and 2, reflecting that the reliability of
individual processors for architecture 3 is much greater
than that of the others and there are only 2 that can fail
[Nod fails ]
Figure 37: Fault tree model of architecture 2 processing
node with cold spares
[ Node fails ]
Figure 38: Fault tree model of architecture 2 processing
node with warm spares
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Figure 39: Comparison of node unreliabilities of all three
architectures using hot spares
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Figure 40: Unreliability of architecture 2 processing nodes
with various types of spares
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8}
[9]
instead of 5. As anticipated, the unreliability for archi- [10]
tecture 2 nodes is slightly better than the unreliability for
architecture 1 nodes.
Figure 40 shows the 10 year unreliabilities for Architec-
ture 2 processing nodes using hot, warm, and cold spares.
In general, the reliability increases from configuration to [11]
configuration in that order. This is to be expected, since
the failure rate of the spare during its inactive period de-
creases in that order.
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GLOSSARY
Most terms unique to reliability modeling and fault-tolerant systems are defined within th(,
body of each volume of this Technical Paper. The meaning of some terms ar(' well known to
researchers and users of these technologies but may not be familiar to new users of ttvl)rid
Automated Reliability Predictor (HARP) integrated reliability tool (HiRel) system. Thus, the
purpose of this glossary is to primarily aid new users.
Availability
Availability is a t)robabilistic quantity that predicts the ot)erational life of a syst(,m that is
subject to line maintenance (repair). Availability is tile prol)at)ility that a system mL(ter rel)air
is operational at. a specified time. In a Markov chain model representation, repair is nlo(h,l(_(t
by adding transitions from states with n + 1 failed ('onlpoIi(?lltS tO states with _ components.
The transition rate is given as a repair rate. No fault tree model repres('ntation has y('t l)ecn
developed to represent an availability model; therefore, a Markov chain mod(q must t)e giv(,n
to HARP for solu.tion. A fanlt tree model can be used to specify and g(uwrate a pr('lindnary
Markov chain model that the user needs to modify.
Behavioral Decomposition
Behavioral dcconq)osition is a mat.hematical ai)proximation techni(tu(, that redlwes a comt)l('x
fault/error handling model (FEIIM) to a branch point in a Markov chain. The ('ff('cts of the
FEHM tire compensated for by modifying state transition rates. The advantag(, of this t('chni(ttw
is that it, greatly reduces the size of Markov models for solution and complex FEHM I)ehavior
that can be non-Markovian can be modeled.
Bounds or Mathematical Bounds
Large or complex mathematical models often require approximations to keet) their solutions
tractable. Bounds are the numerical expressions of the variation in a computed result due to
mathematical approximation or uncertainty in the accuracy of t.tm inlmt data to tile mo(hqs.
Combinatorial Model
A combinatorial model is a stochastic model that relates combinatorial component failure or
success events to a subsystem or system failure or success, respectively. Combinatorial models
do not distinguish the order of failure events.
Coincident Fault
A coincMent fault exists at the same time one or more other faults are present. A coincident
fault is not a simultaneous fault.
Conservative Unreliability Result
Mathematical quantities can be expressed in two forms, in exact form, which is usually a
symbolic representation such a,s the number rr, or in an approximate form such as a decimal
representation for 7r as 3.14159. When approximations are necessary, the difference between the
exact quantity (which may not be obtainable) and the computed result (which is obtainable) is
called the error. A conservative unreliability result is one where the error in the computed result
is in the direction of increased unreliability.
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Critical-Pair Fault
A critical fault is a near-coincident fault involving two faults. HARP uses three multifault
models to account for critical-pair faults: ALL, SAME, and USER.
Extended Behavioral Decomposition
Extended behavioral decomposition is a generalized behavioral decomposition technique that
allows multiple FEHM entry/exit transitions and multifault near-coincident modeling.
Fault Tree
A fault tree is a notational model that uses symbols resembling logic gates that relates failure
events of components or subsystems to failure events of a system composed of components and
subsystems.
Instantaneous Jump Model
An instantaneous jump model is a Markov model that is an approximation of a more complex
semi-Markov model that produces a conservative result with respect to the semi-Markov model
that is operated on mathematically to become the instantaneous jump model.
Multifault Model
A nmltifault model is a'fault/error handling model that accounts for two or more faults, none
occurring simultaneously.
Near-Coincident Fault
A near-coincident fault is second fault that occurs during the time between the occurrence
of a first fault and its recovery.
Near- Coincident Failure
A near-coincident failure is system failure resulting from a near-coincident fault. To reduce
modeling complexity, a near-coincident failure is assumed to result from a near-coincident fault.
Typically, this assumption results in a conservative result.
Optimistic Unreliability Result
An optimistic unreliability result occurs when the error in the computed result is in the
direction of decreased unreliability.
Primitive
A primitive is any screen image that is an entity that can be manipulated without dissection,
for example, a line, a circle, a fault tree gate, etc.
Semi-Markov Models
Semi-Markov models are generalizations of Markov models. In particular, semi-Markov
models allow generalized state holding time distributions. Semi-Markov models are required
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for fault-tolerant system models to account for fault/error handling times that may not be
exponential.
Sequence-Dependent Model
A sequence-dependent model is a stochastic model that relates ordered component failure
or success events to a subsystem or system failure or success, respectively. Sequence-dependent
models distinguish the order of failure events. These models are more complex than combinato-
rial models and are also more difficult to solve.
Simultaneous Fault
A simultaneous fault is a second fault that occurs at exactly the same instant in time as a
first fault. Markov chain models do not allow such faults.
Weibull Distribution
A Weibull distribution is a two parameter distribution that can exhibit time increasing,
decreasing, or constant failure rates.
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